A General Analysis of Sequential Merger Games with an Application to Cross-Border Mergers by Alberto Salvo
 
A General Analysis of Sequential Merger Games,  
with an Application to Cross-Border Mergers 
 
Alberto Salvo* 







1.Introduction          
2. General conditions for equilibria in sequential merger games        
3. Example 1: Cross-border mergers in Sutton's (1991) vertically-differentiated 
industry 
4. Example 2: Cross-border mergers in the Perry and Porter (1985) model 
5. Revisiting the vertically-differentiated-industry model: Investment integration 
and fixed costs of merger       







The Toyota Centre 
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for 
Economics and Related Disciplines 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Discussion  paper    Houghton  Street 
No.  EI/36     London  WC2A  2AE 




*  I am particularly grateful to my PhD supervisor John Sutton for his help. Comments 
from Roman Inderst, Massimo Motta and Helder Vasconcelos are also appreciated. 
Financial support from the LSE and from CAPES is gratefully acknowledged. I am 
also grateful to STICERD for providing research facilities. Date of first draft: 




This paper seeks to uncover why the pattern of equilibria in sequential merger 
games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of models much 
studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising each 
element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the solution to models that 
satisfy a certain sufficient condition will be restricted to the same subset of 
equilibria. This result is of empirical relevance in that the pattern of equilibria 
obtained for this wide class of models is associated with mergers not happening 
in isolation but rather bunching together. I extend the results to the analysis of 
cross-border mergers, studying two standard models that satisfy the sufficient 
condition -- Sutton's (1991) vertically-differentiated oligopoly and Perry and 
Porter's (1985) fixed-supply-of-capital model. 
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Several papers have studied the interdependence of horizontal mergers by modelling a
particular type of sequential game of merger formation (Fauli-Oller 2000, Matsushima
2001, Motta and Vasconcelos 2003). In this type of game, merger decisions are made
in sequence by di⁄erent and exogenous groups of ￿rms, ending in a product market
competition stage. Despite employing di⁄erent setups, such as di⁄erent demand or cost
conditions, or di⁄erent merger technologies, the pattern of equilibria in the sequential
game is similar across these models. As parameter values vary, only elements from the
same subset of the set of possible equilibria is obtained. The equilibrium outcomes
corresponding to the equilibria obtained in all of these papers is such that either all
groups of ￿rms that are allowed to merge choose to do so or that none of the groups
of ￿rms choose to merge. In particular, outcomes where only some groups of ￿rms
choose to merge while other groups choose not to are not supported in equilibrium. As
will be noted, this ￿all-or-none￿￿nding may be of empirical relevance in that mergers
are commonly observed to ￿bunch￿together, where periods of high merger activity are
followed by periods of low activity.
Fauli-Oller (2000) considers cost-asymmetric ￿rms facing linear demand under Cournot
competition. In the merger stages, prior to the ￿nal market competition stage, low-cost
￿rms are allowed to bid in sequence for their high-cost counterparts. In a spatial context,
Matsushima (2001) studies sequential mergers by placing ￿rms symmetrically around a
unit circle, with ￿rms facing linear demand at each consumer location and engaging in
Cournot competition. Sequential pairwise mergers between ￿rms located diametrically
opposite one another are then allowed. Motta and Vasconcelos (2003) consider an indus-
try with a ￿xed supply of capital distributed among its ￿rms, with ￿rms￿marginal costs
being a decreasing function of the capital they own1. Exogenous groups of ￿rms decide
in sequence on whether to merge, leading up to a market competition stage. What is of
interest to me in the current paper is that, despite the di⁄erent setups of each model, the
equilibria obtained are of underlying similarity, in the sense that only a similar subset
of the set of possible equilibria of the sequential merger game is obtained.
This paper makes two contributions. The ￿rst aim is to uncover this underlying
similarity in the pattern of equilibria across these models studied in the literature. By
writing conditions on ￿rms￿reduced-form pro￿t functions, I characterise each possible
equilibrium of the sequential merger game. I explain why only a similar subset of the set
of possible equilibria is obtained in these models by reference to a su¢ cient condition
which holds across these models. When this condition is satis￿ed, a common subset of the
set of possible equilibria is ruled out. I motivate this su¢ cient condition by resorting to
the way non-participating ￿rms react to the merger of rival ￿rms, as is well understood in
the literature (see Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983 in the case of Cournot competition,
and Deneckere and Davidson 1985 in the case of Bertrand competition).
The second aim is to illustrate that the class of models for which this similar pattern
of equilibria is obtained is fairly broad. To this end, I develop two other standard
examples ￿Sutton￿ s (1991) vertically-di⁄erentiated Cournot oligopoly and Perry and
Porter￿ s (1985) quadratic-cost (￿xed-supply-of-capital) model ￿in which the su¢ cient
1This feature of their model is thus similar to the second example presented in this paper, based on
Perry and Porter (1985).
1condition holds. As such, the same pattern of equilibria as that in, say, Fauli-Oller
(2000) obtains. By introducing an additional parameter (namely a trade cost between
two countries), I frame the sequential merger game in both examples in a cross-border
context. I thus extend the results to the analysis of cross-border mergers.
Adapting a vertically-di⁄erentiated Cournot oligopoly model due to Sutton (1991)
and later applied in a trade context by Motta (1992, 1994), I allow high-quality ￿rms
located in one country to merge with low-quality ￿rms located in the second country. The
merger technology is such that if a merger is undertaken, the level of quality o⁄ered by
the merged (multinational) ￿rm is the higher of the qualities o⁄ered by its constituent
￿rms. Further, goods produced in one country but sold in another (exports) incur
(linear) trade costs. Thus cross-border mergers enable ￿rms to transfer technology.
The second example is an adaptation of Perry and Porter (1985)￿ s quadratic-cost
model. This model is of particular interest for the following reason. The majority of
models (with single-product ￿rms) in the merger literature considers a merged ￿rm to be
￿about￿the same size (bar the presence of merger synergies) as each of its constituent
￿rms and the non-participating ￿rms; there is no notion of assets or ￿rm size. In
contrast, in the Perry and Porter model, a merger results in a ￿new ￿rm that is ￿ larger￿
than the others￿(pp. 219). They model this by assuming a ￿xed factor of production
(say capital) whose total supply is ￿xed to the industry; what distinguishes ￿rms is the
amount they own of this factor2. In the adaptation, I again allow mergers between ￿rms
located in the di⁄erent countries, where the capital stock of the merged (multinational)
￿rm is the sum of the capital stock of its constituents. Thus, the ￿larger￿multinational
￿rm has a lower marginal cost than either of its constituents at a given level of output.
This all-or-none merger result is of empirical relevance in that the pattern of equilibria
found for this fairly wide ￿as I claim ￿class of models is associated with mergers not
happening in isolation but rather bunching together. Empirical studies have tested
for bunching, or wave-like behaviour, using aggregate industry data (see, for example,
Town 1992, Golbe and White 1993, and Barkoulas et al 2001) while other authors
have argued that this phenomenon is also observed within individual industries (Mueller
1989). Casual observation suggests, moreover, that this kind of bunching phenomenon
appears to be of relevance also in the case of cross-border merger activity (UNCTAD
2000, Knickerbocker 1973). Caves (1991) o⁄ers two lines of reasoning to explain why
mergers may bunch together. One line attributes this to an unprecedented shift in an
exogenous industry- or economy-wide parameter suddenly making mergers pro￿table3.
The other line looks at the strategic interaction between ￿rms￿merger decisions within
an industry: under certain conditions ￿rms will merge only if rivals merge. It is the
latter line of reasoning which sequential merger games have sought to address.
Using similar notation and structure to the sequential merger game laid out in Nilssen
and S/ orgard (1998), in the following section I spell out general conditions ￿in terms
2In the Perry and Porter (1985) model, on which my example is based, marginal cost is linear in
output; by increasing its capital stock, the ￿rm reduces the slope of its marginal cost curve. In Motta
and Vasconcelos (2003), marginal cost is ￿ at in output; a higher capital stock lowers marginal cost,
regardless of output.
3On this ￿rst line of reasoning, Stigler (1950) and Bittlingmayer (1985) analyse the e⁄ects of changes
in competition policy. Van Wegberg (1994) studies how the business cycle a⁄ects the pro￿tability of
mergers.
2of ￿rms￿reduced-form pro￿t functions ￿ characterising each possible equilibrium. I
show that if a certain su¢ cient condition holds then a subset of the possible equilibria
can be ruled out. I brie￿ y illustrate the general analysis by reference to Fauli-Oller
(2000). I then turn to this paper￿ s application, developing two further standard examples
in which the su¢ cient condition holds, and showing that the general analysis can be
extended to the case of cross-border mergers. Section 3 lays out and solves the sequential
merger game in the vertically-di⁄erentiated Cournot oligopoly. Results are discussed in
light of the international trade and investment literature, where foreign investment has
been modelled mostly in the form of green￿eld investment, as opposed to mergers and
acquisitions. I argue that modelling foreign investment in the form of cross-border
mergers suggests just how widespread such activity may be. Considerations are also
made on the robustness of results to the number of merger stages and on the speci￿cation
of the extensive form of the merger game (i.e. sequential moves in counterpoint to merger
decisions being made simultaneously). Section 4 considers the ￿xed-capital-stock model
of Perry and Porter (1984), to show that similar results hold. In Section 5 I revisit
the vertically-di⁄erentiated oligopoly model to introduce ￿xed costs associated with
implementing a merger. In so doing I attempt to address an inherent weakness in the
results of Sections 3 and 4 as to their usefulness in explaining the typically-observed
￿ urry of merger activity as countries integrate their markets: if, as the results in these
earlier sections suggest, cross-border mergers occur along the equilibrium path for a
￿large￿region of parameter space, then why were these mergers not undertaken prior to
market intergration? Section 6 brie￿ y concludes.
2 General conditions for equilibria in sequential merger
games
I begin by de￿ning the structure of the sequential merger game, following Nilssen and
S/ orgard (1998)4. In brief, disjoint and exogenously-given groups of ￿rms make sequential
merger decisions, leading up to a ￿nal market competition stage, where payo⁄s of the
merged and independent ￿rms are conditional on market structure resulting from the
earlier merger stages. Bearing in mind the later aim of extending the results to a cross-
border context, I adapt the notation and structure to a two-country setting. (I also
point out how the analysis easily collapses to the single-country case.)
Consider two countries, l 2 fA;Bg, each initially with nl ￿rms, where nl ￿ 2. Denote
the set of ￿rms located in country A as A and the set of B-country ￿rms as B; thus
nA = jAj, nB = jBj and the global industry consists of n := nA + nB ￿ 4 ￿rms. Now
consider the following form of sequential (cross-border) merger games. Assume that two
cross-border mergers5 can take place in sequence in this industry: label the set of ￿rms
that ￿rst decide whether to merge M1, and the set of ￿rms that subsequently decide
whether to merge M2. Label the merged ￿rms possibly arising from the ￿rst and second
4Where convenient, I use similar notation and structure to that in Nilssen and S/ orgard (1998)￿ s
general discussion of sequential merger decisions. This is done for the bene￿t of the reader who is
acquainted with their paper and also to point out how this section builds on their work. Notice that
there is no repeated product market interaction as in Kamien and Zang (1990, 1993).
5The choice of two mergers is done for ease of exposition, as in Nilssen and S/ orgard (1998). In the
application of Section 3 I consider a set-up where three mergers can take place, in addition to the case
with two mergers, and discuss the implications of allowing greater numbers of mergers to take place.
3merger decisions M1 and M2 respectively. The extensive form of the merger game in
consideration satis￿es the following assumptions:
￿ At least two ￿rms take part in each merger decision, i.e. jMij ￿ 2, i 2 f1;2g.
￿ At least one ￿rm from each country takes part in each merger decision, i.e. A \
Mi 6= ; and B \ Mi 6= ;, i 2 f1;2g.
￿ Each ￿rm participates in at most one merger decision, M1 \ M2 = ;, so that
jM1j + jM2j ￿ n.
An example is in order: country A has three ￿rms, labelled 1, 2 and 3, while country
B has two ￿rms, labelled 4 and 5. The sequential merger game given by ￿rms 1 and 4
￿rst deciding whether to merge, followed by ￿rms 2 and 5 deciding whether to merge,
would satisfy the above assumptions. If both mergers are carried through, the market
structure is given by two (multinational) merged ￿rms M1 and M2, where M1 = f1;4g
and M2 = f2;5g, and an independent ￿rm located in country A, ￿rm 3.
Coming out of the merger stages, four situations (market structures) are possible
(see Figure 1). Denote the situation where neither merger is undertaken by s0. If the
￿rms in M1 do not merge but those in M2 do, call this situation s1; in contrast, let
situation s2 depict a favourable merger decision by ￿rms in M1 followed by a no-merger
decision by ￿rms in M2. Finally, situation s3 denotes the market structure arising from
two favourable merger decisions6.
Finally, the ￿rms which have merged or remained independent compete on the world
market; goods produced in one country can be exported for consumption in the other
country. This completes the description of the type of sequential cross-border merger
games being considered7.
2.1 Reduced-form pro￿t functions and conditions
Denote the equilibrium payo⁄ to ￿rm i under market structure s by ￿i;s, where s 2
fs0;s1;s2;s3g and i 2 S ￿ A [ B [ fM1;M2g, with S being the set of (merged and/or
independent) ￿rms competing under market structure s. Note that ￿i;s is in reduced
form, indexed by a vector of ￿primitives￿ of the speci￿c model in question, such as
demand and supply-side parameters8. The merger surplus functions are then de￿ned in
terms of these reduced-form pro￿t functions.
6Note that situations s1 and s2 are reversed as compared to the use of notation by Nilssen and
S/ orgard (1998).
7As I comment shortly, if there is no geographic dimension to the game and a single-country setting
is being considered, the second assumption, namely that at least one ￿rm from each country takes
part in each merger decision, is dropped. There is no longer a distinction between ￿rms located in one
country or the other and the relevant set of ￿rms is I := A [ B.
8Formally, the reduced-form payo⁄ function is ￿i;s(￿), where ￿ 2 P is the vector of parameters
capturing relevant features of the model and P is the space of parameters. For ease of exposition, I
suppress the argument ￿ of the functions.
4De￿nition 1 (Merger surplus functions) De￿ne six ￿ functions9 as follows:
￿I := ￿M2;s1 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s0 ￿IV := ￿M1;s2 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s1
￿II := ￿M2;s3 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s2 ￿V := ￿M1;s2 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s0
￿III := ￿M1;s3 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s0 ￿V I := ￿M1;s3 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s1
Figure 1 illustrates the six merger surplus functions. To exemplify, ￿III is the dif-
ference between the pro￿t of merged ￿rm M1 under market structure s3 and the sum
of pro￿ts of its constituent (independent) ￿rms under market structure s0. As shown
below, these six functions capture the surplus behind all the relevant merger decisions
by either ￿rms in M1, in the ￿rst stage, or ￿rms in M2, in the second stage.
It follows from the consideration of two sequential merger stages that there are eight
possible sets of Nash strategies by the players. These are illustrated in Figure 210. In
sets (a), (b), (g) and (h), the early ￿rms￿merger decision has no e⁄ect on the subsequent
￿rms￿merger decision. By way of example, for set (a) to be an equilibrium, ￿rms in M2
need to ￿nd it pro￿table to merge irrespective of M1-￿rms￿decision whether to merge
or not. Also, ￿rms in M1 need to ￿nd it pro￿table to merge in anticipation of M2-￿rms￿
subsequent merger decision.
In sets (of strategies) (c), (d), (e) and (f), on the other hand, the subsequent ￿rms￿
merger decision does depend on the early ￿rms￿merger decision. If set (c) characterises
an equilibrium, then ￿rms in M2 ￿nd it pro￿table to merge only if ￿rms in M1 merge.
(To complete the characterisation of this equilibrium, ￿rms in M1 must ￿nd it prof-
itable to merge, anticipating how the subsequent merger decision depends on their own
decision.) As in set (a), mergers occur along the equilibrium path of the game yet here
M1-￿rms￿merger decision has a bearing on (and takes place anticipating) M2-￿rms￿
merger decision11.
Proposition 1 states necessary and su¢ cient conditions for each of these sets of
strategies to form an equilibrium (unique for a given combination of parameters)12.
9The notation here departs from that in Nilssen and S/ orgard (1998) for the following reason. While I
de￿ne six functions, for the purposes of their paper they de￿ne eight ￿pro￿tability of merger￿functions
for merger participants, in addition to four such functions for non-participating parties to a merger.







1 respectively, in their paper.
10To avoid clutter, I rely on Figure 2 to de￿ne each of the eight sets of Nash strategies, rather than
doing so in words. In any case, this is standard. For example, set (c) would be de￿ned as follows.
M1-￿rms: ￿ merger￿ ; M2-￿rms: ￿ merger￿only if M1-￿rms merge, otherwise ￿ no merger￿ .
11Some authors, such as Fauli-Oller (2000), have related results (c) and (d) to the merger-wave
phenomenon, in the sense that an early decision to merge (either along the equilibrium path of the
game, as in (c), or as a deviation from it, as in (d)) triggers subsequent mergers.
12Proposition 1 is consistent with Proposition 1 in Nilssen and S/ orgard (1998; pp.1689). One must
be careful, however, in comparing the conditions in their Propostion 2 and Table 1 (pp.1690-1) with
mine. For example, they state that ￿the occurrence of a Fat Cat strategy implies a sequence of two
decisions to merge￿ (pp.1691) yet this stands at odds with my conditions (and their Proposition 1)
for a sequence of two mergers to be supported as an equilibrium outcome. They refer to a ￿Fat Cat￿
strategy as ￿1
2 < 0 < ￿2
2 and ￿2
￿2 > 0. Yet these same conditions could also lead to a sequence of two
decisions not to merge as long as ￿1
1 is su¢ ciently negative such that ￿3
1 = ￿1
1+￿2
￿2 < 0. If ￿1
2 < 0 <
￿2
2 (i.e. ￿I < 0 < ￿II in my Proposition 1) then ￿3
1 > 0 (i.e. ￿III > 0) is the necessary and su¢ cient
condition supporting a ￿sequence of two decisions to merge￿ .
5Proposition 1 (NSC for equilibria) Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for each of
Nash-strategy sets (a) to (h), as depicted in Figure 2, to be supported as the unique
equilibrium (for a given combination of parameters) are:
Set (a) ￿I ￿ 0, ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿V I ￿ 0
Set (b) ￿I ￿ 0, ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿V I < 0
Set (c) ￿I < 0, ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿III ￿ 0
Set (d) ￿I < 0, ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿III < 0
Set (e) ￿I ￿ 0, ￿II < 0 and ￿IV ￿ 0
Set (f) ￿I ￿ 0, ￿II < 0 and ￿IV < 0
Set (g) ￿I < 0, ￿II < 0 and ￿V ￿ 0
Set (h) ￿I < 0, ￿II < 0 and ￿V < 0
Proof. This follows by backward induction. Begin by the conditions for set (a) to
be the equilibrium. In the second stage, following a decision by M1-￿rms not to merge,
M2-￿rms will ￿nd it pro￿table to merge if and only if ￿I = ￿M2;s1 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s0 ￿ 0.
Conditional on a favourable merger decision by M1-￿rms, that M2-￿rms ￿nd it prof-
itable to merge requires ￿II = ￿M2;s3 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s2 ￿ 0. In the ￿rst stage, anticipating
M2-￿rms￿subsequent merger regardless of its merger decision, M1-￿rms will ￿nd it prof-
itable to merge if and only if ￿V I = ￿M1;s3 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s1 ￿ 0. Turn to the conditions
for (b). As in (a), M2-￿rms￿strategy is optimal if and only if ￿I ￿ 0 and ￿II ￿ 0. Yet
for ￿rms in M1 choosing not to merge to be optimal implies ￿V I < 0. For (c) to be the
equilibrium, M2-￿rms ￿nding it pro￿table to merge in the second stage only if M1-￿rms
choose to merge earlier requires ￿I < 0 and ￿II ￿ 0. In the ￿rst stage, anticipating
how M2-￿rms￿merger decision depends on its own decision, M1-￿rms will merge if and
only if ￿III = ￿M1;s3 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s0 ￿ 0. In (d), as in (c), M2-￿rms￿strategy is optimal
if and only if ￿I < 0 and ￿II ￿ 0. Yet ￿rms in M1 will ￿nd it optimal not to merge
if and only if ￿III < 0. Proofs of conditions for sets of strategies (e) through (h) to be
equilibria follow similarly and are omitted.
2.2 Special case: Symmetry
When the sets of ￿rms M1 and M2 are ￿symmetric￿ , a common case in models studied
in the literature, the general conditions characterising each possible equilibrium can be
simpli￿ed. What I mean by symmetry here needs to be made precise:
De￿nition 2 (Symmetry) There is symmetry about the sets of ￿rms M1 and M2 when






￿ ￿M1;s2 = ￿M2;s1






6In words, the sum of payo⁄s of (independent) ￿rms in M1 under market structure
s1 (where only M2-￿rms have merged) equals the sum of payo⁄s of (independent) ￿rms
in M2 under market structure s2 (where only M1-￿rms have merged). The payo⁄ to
(merged) ￿rm M1 under market structure s2 equals the payo⁄to (merged) ￿rm M2 under
market structure s1. The payo⁄to (merged) ￿rm M1 equals the payo⁄to (merged) ￿rm
M2 when the two mergers have taken place (market structure s3). The sum of payo⁄s
of (independent) ￿rms in M1 equals the sum of payo⁄s of (independent) ￿rms in M2
when no merger has been carried through (market structure s0).
Recall the above example, where ￿rms 1, 2 and 3 are located in country A, ￿rms 4
and 5 are located in country B and the sequential merger game speci￿es ￿rms 1 and 4
￿rst deciding whether to merge (if so forming M1), followed by ￿rms 2 and 5 deciding
whether to merge (if so forming M2). Symmetry would require that: (i) the sum of
payo⁄s to ￿rms 1 and 4 under market structure s1 = fM2;1;3;4g equals the sum of
payo⁄s to ￿rms 2 and 5 under market structure s2 = fM1;2;3;5g, (ii) the payo⁄ to M1
under market structure s2 = fM1;2;3;5g equals the payo⁄to M2 under market structure
s1 = fM2;1;3;4g, (iii) the payo⁄ to M1 equals the payo⁄ to M2 under market structure
s3 = fM1;M2;3g, and ￿nally, (iv) the sum of payo⁄s to ￿rms 1 and 4 equals the sum of
payo⁄s to ￿rms 2 and 5 under fragmented market structure s0 = f1;2;3;4;5g.
By symmetry, it follows from De￿nition 1 that ￿I = ￿V and ￿II = ￿V I. Only
four merger surplus functions ￿ need now be computed. The number of possible sets
of strategies by the players that can be supported in equilibrium collapses to six : sets
(b) and (g) are no longer possible13. The conditions for each to form an equilibrium are
simpli￿ed somewhat, as stated in the following proposition (see Figure 3):
Proposition 2 (NSC for equilibria in the case of symmetry) In the special case of sym-
metry, Nash-strategy sets (b) and (g) cannot be supported in equilibrium. Necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for each of the six remaining sets to be supported as the unique
equilibrium (for a given combination of parameters) are:
Set (a) ￿I ￿ 0 and ￿II ￿ 0
Set (b) This cannot be supported in equilibrium
Set (c) ￿I < 0, ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿III ￿ 0
Set (d) ￿I < 0, ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿III < 0
Set (e) ￿I ￿ 0, ￿II < 0 and ￿IV ￿ 0
Set (f) ￿I ￿ 0, ￿II < 0 and ￿IV < 0
Set (g) This cannot be supported in equilibrium
Set (h) ￿I < 0 and ￿II < 0
Proof. This follows from the de￿nition of symmetry, the de￿nition of the ￿ functions
and Proposition 3.
A simple corollary to Proposition 2 states a su¢ cient condition that rules out each
of sets (d), (e) and (f) as candidate equilibria. A model that satis￿es this su¢ cient
13This is intuitive. For example, consider set (b). If it is optimal for M2-￿rms to merge regardless
of M1-￿rms￿earlier decision, including when M1-￿rms decide to merge (this requires ￿II ￿ 0), then it
cannot be optimal for M1-￿rms to decide not to merge, knowing that M2-￿rms will subsequently decide
to merge regardless of their decision (by symmetry, this would require ￿V I = ￿II < 0, in contradiction).
7condition for every admissible combination of parameter values can only have sets (a),
(c) and (h) among its equilibria. That is, of the eight possible equilibria in Figure 2, only
the three equilibria highlighted in Figure 3 remain in the case of any symmetric model
that satis￿es the corollary￿ s su¢ cient condition. This is the case for several models
considered in the literature, in addition to the two models considered in this paper￿ s
subsequent application.
Corollary 1 (Su¢ cient condition to rule out sets (d), (e) and (f) as candidate equilib-
ria, in the case of symmetry) Consider that symmetry holds in the sense de￿ned above.
If for all admissible parameter values, it holds that (i) whenever ￿I ￿ 0 it happens that
￿II ￿ 0, and (ii) whenever ￿II ￿ 0 it happens that ￿III ￿ 0, then Nash-strategy sets
(d), (e) and (f) cannot be supported in equilibrium.
Formally, this su¢ cient condition can be stated as
f￿ j ￿I(￿) ￿ 0g ￿ f￿ j ￿II(￿) ￿ 0g ￿ f￿ j ￿III(￿) ￿ 0g
where ￿ is a vector of admissible parameter values (see earlier footnote).
Proof of the corollary follows by inspection of Proposition 214. A comment is in
order. The corollary states only a su¢ cient condition that rules out sets (d), (e) and (f)
as candidate equilibria for symmetric models. As I argue, this condition is satis￿ed for
a fairly wide class of models. However, other su¢ cient conditions can be written that
rule out each of sets (d), (e) and (f), as I show in Appendix A.
An illustration: Fauli-Oller (2000)15 I brie￿ y illustrate the su¢ cient condition of
Corollary 1 by reference to Fauli-Oller￿ s (2000) (symmetric) model. There are four ￿rms
in a homogeneous-good Cournot industry: ￿rms 1 and 2 have zero marginal cost, while
￿rms 3 and 4 have constant marginal cost c > 0. Demand is linear, where the price
intercept is given by ￿ (and the slope is normalised to ￿1). As such, the parameters ￿
of the model are given by ￿ and c, and Fauli-Oller admits parameters in the range given
by ￿ > 3c. A slightly simpli￿ed version of the sequential merger game considered by the
author has ￿rms 1 and 3 ￿rst deciding whether to merge (i.e. M1 = f1;3g), followed
by ￿rms 2 and 4 who then decide whether to merge (i.e. M2 = f2;4g); a ￿nal market
competition stage ensues. The merger technology is such that a merged entity produces
with zero cost (the cost of its lower-cost constituent). From the reduced-form payo⁄
functions for this standard Cournot model (stated by the author in equation 1), the
14See Appendix A. The su¢ cient condition of the corollary can be phrased as follows: (i) whenever it
is pro￿table to merge in isolation, it happens that it is pro￿table to merge conditional on the merger of
the rival set of ￿rms; (ii) whenever it is pro￿table to merge conditional on the merger of the rival set of
￿rms, it happens that each set of ￿rms (i.e. M1 and M2) prefers that the two mergers are undertaken
over no merger being undertaken.
15When there is no geographic dimension to the sequential merger game ￿as in Nilssen and S/ orgard
(1998) or in this illustration ￿ the setup of the general analysis just presented requires one minor
simpli￿cation. Since there is no longer a distinction between ￿rms located in one country or the other,
the assumption that at least one ￿rm from each country takes part in each merger decision no longer
holds. The two other assumptions remain, that at least two ￿rms take part in each merger decision and
that each ￿rm participates in at most one merger decision. The set A[B can be replaced by I, de￿ned
as the initial set of (independent) ￿rms, containing n elements. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for equilibria are as in Proposition 1 and, in the special case of symmetry, Proposition 2.





































It is easy to show that the su¢ cient condition of the corollary holds: (i) for all (￿;c)
such that ￿I ￿ 0 it happens that ￿II ￿ 0, and (ii) for all (￿;c) such that ￿II ￿ 0
it happens that ￿III ￿ 0. Consequently, only Nash-strategy sets (a), (c) and (h) can
obtain in equilibrium as parameter values vary. (It is easy to show from these three
merger surplus functions that all three sets indeed are supported as unique equilibria
at di⁄erent ranges of parameters.) Notice from Figure 3 that the outcomes associated
with these equilibria are such that mergers do not occur in isolation but rather bunch
together. In other words, whenever a merger happens along the equilibrium path of the
game it is undertaken alongside other mergers. I postpone discussion of this result ￿
which hinges on the way non-participating ￿rms react to the merger of rival ￿rms, as is
well understood in the literature ￿to the application.
3 Example 1: Cross-border mergers in Sutton￿ s (1991)
vertically-di⁄erentiated industry
The ￿rst example explores the pro￿tability of sequential cross-border mergers in a
Cournot oligopoly with vertical product di⁄erentiation. I use a partial equilibrium model
with di⁄erentiated goods due to Sutton (1991) and later applied in a trade context by
Motta (1992, 1994).
Before carefully laying out the setup, a brief description is in order. I embed the
two countries, a large country and a small country, each with three ￿rms, where ￿rms
in the large country o⁄er a product of quality at least as high as that o⁄ered by ￿rms in
the small country. While product quality varies between the ￿rms located in di⁄erent
countries, it does not (initially) vary across ￿rms located within the same country. The
structure of the sequential cross-border merger game in Section 2, where two cross-
border mergers were allowed to take place in sequence, is extended here to three merger
stages: in each stage a large-country high-quality ￿rm and a small-country low-quality
￿rm decide whether to merge or not. If the merger takes place, the level of quality
o⁄ered by the merged (and multinational) ￿rm is the higher of the qualities o⁄ered by
its constituent ￿rms (i.e. the quality o⁄ered previously by the large-country constituent).
Thus cross-border mergers enable ￿rms to transfer technology. Consistent with the type
of sequential cross-border merger game spelled out in Section 2, in a ￿nal stage, ￿rms
which have merged or remained independent engage in Cournot competition on the
world market.
Demand setup Consider two countries, l 2 fA;Bg, with ml consumers each. Con-
sumers in both countries have identical preferences de￿ned over a quality (di⁄erentiated)
good and an outside good, indexed by quantities x and y respectively, where u denotes
the quality level of the quality good:
U = (ux)
￿y
1￿￿ 0 < ￿ < 1








where nl is the number of ￿rms selling in country l (nl ￿ 2), xi and pi are respectively
the quantity and price of the (single) quality good sold by ￿rm i (referred to as variety i),
and zk is the income of consumer k. Assume SA ￿ SB due either to a larger population
or a higher per capita income in (large) country A relative to (small) country B.
Given any vector of qualities and associated prices, the consumer chooses a variety
i that maximises the quality/price ratio
ui
pi
16. All varieties that command positive sales




where ￿ is a constant. From equation (1), we can then write S =
Pn
i=1 pixi = ￿
Pn
i=1 uixi
(momentarily dropping the country subscript l for simplicity), expressing the price-to-




















By assumption each variety i is sold to the nth part of the population.
Supply and historical motivation for entry and quality Firms are assumed to
have the same constant marginal cost of production c > 0. Goods produced in one
country but sold in another (exports) incur an additional unit trade cost t ￿ 0.
As mentioned above, each country is initially embedded with three (independent)
￿rms, where a ￿rm from country l o⁄ers a good of quality ul ￿ 1. By construction,
uA ￿ uB and de￿ne the quality ratio (or gap) v as the ratio of the quality o⁄ered by
large-country ￿rms to that o⁄ered by their small-country counterparts, v :=
uA
uB(￿ 1).
The number of ￿rms in each country and their respective (asymmetric) qualities
can be motivated by considering the following long-term entry and investment game
(Motta 1992). Countries are initially closed to foreign trade and investment and in
this autarkic setting, without forseeing any changes, ￿rms make entry and investment
decisions. In each country, the following two-stage game is played. In a ￿rst stage, ￿rms
simultaneously decide whether to enter and, if so, with which quality. In a second stage,
they engage in Cournot competition. In order to o⁄er a good of quality u, ￿rms must
incur a ￿xed and sunk cost F(u) = u￿, u ￿ 1.
Consistent with models of this type, in equilibrium the same number of ￿rms enters
in each country, with the large-country ￿rms making larger investments in quality than
16Consumer k chooses to consume quantity xik of variety i such that uixik is maximised subject to
his budget constraint pixik = ￿zk; i.e. he solves maxi ￿zk
ui
pi by selecting a variety i such that ui
pi is
maximised across i.
10the small-country ￿rms, uA ￿ uB. The convexity of the ￿xed cost function is chosen so
that three ￿rms enter in each country17.
By this historical motivation, market integration then unexpectedly occurs. Firms
are ￿locked in￿with their previous (autarky-based) quality levels, re￿ ecting the long-
term nature of their investment decisions (capability-building) as opposed to the short-
run process of market integration and market competition. Firms located in each country
are now allowed to export to the other market (due to trade integration) and/or can
merge with a (now) rival ￿rm located in the other market (due to investment integration),
as set out below.
The experience of some Latin American and Southeast Asian countries, which during
the 1990s underwent a relatively unplanned process of trade and investment liberalisa-
tion, with the ensuing high volume of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, comes to
mind. It is in this historical setting that the cross-border merger game is set.
Sequential cross-border merger game In sequence, each of the three ￿rms located
in country A ￿producing with quality uA ￿is allowed to merge with each of the three
￿rms located in country B ￿producing with quality uB. With no loss of generality,
the ￿rst A-country ￿rm and the ￿rst B-country ￿rm which decide whether to merge
(stage 1) are labelled 1 and 4 respectively, the second A-country ￿rm and the second B-
country ￿rm which decide whether to merge (stage 2) are labelled 2 and 5 respectively,
and the third A-country ￿rm and the third B-country ￿rm which decide whether to
merge (stage 3) are labelled 3 and 6 respectively. Keeping with the notation of Section
2, M1 = f1;4g, M2 = f2;5g and M3 = f3;6g and the merged (multinational) ￿rms
which may come to form are labelled M1, M2 and M3. As mentioned above, the merger-
technology assumption is that full transfer of technology takes place, the merged ￿rm
being able to produce at the high level of quality uA not only at its A-country facilities
but also at its B-country facilities18. In the fourth and ￿nal stage, merged or independent
￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot on the world market.
The sequence of merger decisions is depicted in Figure 4, as are the possible market
structures coming out of the merger stages. The market structure where no cross-border
merger occurs, f1;2;3;4;5;6g, is denoted r0, while that where three cross-border merg-
ers are carried through, fM1;M2;M3g, is labelled r3. Given that symmetry holds (in
17See Appendix B for a derivation. The number of ￿rms (in each country), n = 3, depends on the
choice of parameter, ￿ = 3, of the ￿xed cost function, F(u) = u￿. By making the cost function more
convex, i.e. making (R&D, say) spending less e⁄ective in raising quality, the larger is the number of
￿rms entering in equilibrium. For example, for ￿ = 5, n = 4 ￿rms enter in equilibrium. We may write
n = n(￿), where n0 > 0. Notice that n does not depend on market size: this ￿non-convergence￿result
is consistent with the ￿niteness property of many vertical product di⁄erentiation models (Shaked and
Sutton 1983, Sutton 1991). For ￿ = 3, the three ￿rms entering in country l o⁄er a common quality





3 . It follows from the assumption that SA ￿ SB that the quality o⁄ering of a
large-country ￿rm exceeds that of a small-country ￿rm: uA ￿ uB.
18This full-transfer-of-technology assumption is also made in Fauli-Oller (2000), for example. It is
one extreme case of a more general assumption where, by merging with a high-quality foreign ￿rm, a B-
country ￿rm can produce at an ￿average￿level of quality given by, for example, the convex combination
￿uA +(1￿￿)uB, where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 is the technology transfer coe¢ cient. That a low-quality ￿rm located
in a developing country will not always achieve ￿world class￿quality by merging with a high-quality
developed-country counterpart is a fair comment, yet this assumption allows us to examine sequential
mergers in the context of international trade and quality asymmetries in a simple way.
11the sense de￿ned in Section 2), market structures where one cross-border merger is un-
dertaken are denoted r1 and those where two cross-border mergers occur are denoted r2.
For example, r2 comprises structures fM1;M2;3;6g, fM1;M3;2;5g and fM2;M3;1;4g,
where there are two multinational ￿rms and one independent ￿rm producing in each
country19.
3.1 Equilibria as a function of the quality gap and the trade
cost
The reduced-form pro￿ts for each ￿rm, as a function of the parameters in the model, for
every possible market structure are derived in Appendix B. The notation introduced in
Section 2 needs to be complemented: let subscript a denote an independent A-country
￿rm, subscript b denote an independent B-country ￿rm and subscript m denote a merged
(multinational) ￿rm. Thus ￿a;r2, for instance, denotes the payo⁄to an independent ￿rm
located in country A under market structure r2. Reduced-form pro￿ts are a function of
the quality gap v, the trade cost normalised by the marginal cost of production ~ t := t
c
and the market sizes SA and SB.
I assume that (1 ￿)v ￿ 3
2 (the quality ratio is low enough) and (0 ￿)~ t ￿ 3￿2v
2v (the
trade cost is low enough) so that in equilibrium low-quality ￿rms command positive
sales in both countries, i.e. there is two-way (intra-industry) trade between countries
under any market structure where at least two ￿rms remain independent. This space of
parameter values is labelled P. (Such an assumption is made for simplicity of exposition;
extending the space of parameter values outside P, i.e. to include f(v;~ t) 2 R2 j v ￿ 1
and ~ t ￿ 0g￿ P, does not add to the results, as discussed in Appendix B.)
Given that there are three merger stages, merger surplus functions are now denoted
￿ (cf ￿ in Section 2). Coupled with the fact that symmetry holds, eight merger surplus
functions are relevant20, de￿ned as follows (see Figure 4 for an illustration):
De￿nition 3 (Merger surplus functions) De￿ne eight ￿ functions as follows:
￿I := ￿m;r1 ￿ ￿a;r0 ￿ ￿b;r0 ￿V := ￿m;r3 ￿ ￿a;r1 ￿ ￿b;r1
￿II := ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r1 ￿ ￿b;r1 ￿V I := ￿m;r3 ￿ ￿a;r0 ￿ ￿b;r0
￿III := ￿m;r3 ￿ ￿a;r2 ￿ ￿b;r2 ￿V II := ￿m;r1 ￿ ￿a;r1 ￿ ￿b;r1
￿IV := ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r0 ￿ ￿b;r0 ￿V III := ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r2 ￿ ￿b;r2
19For the sake of simplicity, now that there are three merger stages, the r-notation here takes into
account that symmetry holds (cf the s-notation in Section 2, introduced for the general case, as in
Nilssen and S/ orgard 1998).
20While in Section 2, with two merger stages and symmetry the number of relevant merger surplus
functions was four, here it is eight. In general, if there are T merger stages, T ￿ 1, and there is
symmetry, the number of relevant merger surplus functions is given by T ￿ 1 +
PT
i=1 i. If there are





Parameters v, ~ t, SA and SB are suppressed as arguments of the functions here for simplicity. When I
do include arguments, subsequently, I ignore SA and SB since Proposition 3 holds irrespective of market
sizes (these enter the pro￿t functions multiplicatively).
12The su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1 holds Along the lines of Proposition 2 and
Figure 3, how the signs of these merger surplus functions change as parameter values
vary pins down the equilibria of the merger game. One can show that in general there are
twenty possible equilibria in a symmetric three-stage game, and conditions supporting
each can be written. However, the veri￿cation that the model satis￿es the su¢ cient
condition of Corollary 1 simpli￿es matters considerably: the set of candidate equilibria
is reduced from twenty to four elements. This is captured in the following lemma, which
is the natural extension of the su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1 to a game with three
merger stages.
Lemma 1 For (v;~ t) 2 P:
(i) ￿I(v;~ t) ￿ 0 =) ￿II(v;~ t) ￿ 0 =) ￿III(v;~ t) ￿ 0
(ii) ￿II(v;~ t) ￿ 0 =) ￿IV(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿III(v;~ t) ￿ 0 =) ￿V(v;~ t) ￿ 0 =) ￿V I(v;~ t) ￿ 0
While proof that the lemma holds is provided in Appendix B, the intuition is straight-
forward. Consider part (i). A merged ￿rm produces less than the pre-merger sum of
outputs of its constituents since each constituent now internalises the externality it con-
fers upon the other constituent when making its output decision21. Since quantities
are strategic substitutes, ￿rms not participating in the merger (￿outsiders￿ ) respond by
increasing output, which may render a merger unpro￿table for its participants (￿insid-
ers￿ ). (Such ￿accommodation￿was highlighted by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983
in a Cournot model with symmetric ￿rms.) Now, whenever ￿rms in Mi do not ￿nd it
pro￿table to merge when two other cross-border mergers are taking place (i.e. ￿III < 0)
and consequently there are less outsiders to free ride on the merger, then they would not
￿nd it pro￿table to merge were only one other merger (i.e. ￿II < 0), let alone none (i.e.
￿I < 0), taking place, as there would be more free-riders to expand output following
Mi-￿rms￿merger22. As for part (ii) of the lemma, consider ￿II ￿ 0 =) ￿IV ￿ 0, for
example. The decision to merge captured by merger surplus function ￿II entails an op-
portunity cost given by the sum of the pro￿ts of an independent A-country ￿rm and an
independent B-country ￿rm under market structure r1. This opportunity cost is larger
than the opportunity cost in the decision to merge captured by ￿IV, which amounts to
the pro￿ts of the same two independent ￿rms but under r0, a more ￿fragmented￿market
structure (in the sense that while in r1 there are ￿ve ￿rms selling into each country, in
r0 there are six ￿rms)23.
21In this model, for (v;~ t) 2 P, this occurs despite the quality jump from uB to uA enjoyed by the
B-country constituent. More generally, note that if a quality increase (or, isomorphously, a marginal
cost reduction) through merger were very large, insiders to the merger could actually expand output.
A merger, by lowering prices, would then be detrimental to outsiders, who would respond by lowering
output (under quantity competition).
22Fauli-Oller (2000) interprets a similar result as ￿previous takeovers stimulate takeover pro￿tability￿
(pp.197).
23In this model, in the space P of parameter values, it can be shown that despite merging parties
having the advantage of producing with high quality in both countries and no longer cross-hauling
product between them, non-participants always gain in the event of a merger, be they multinational
￿rms or independent ￿rms. Part (ii) of the lemma follows from noting this. Outside P, for example, for ~ t
high enough (and v > 1) that not even high-quality A-country ￿rms command positive sales in country
B (i.e. trade ￿ ows in neither direction), a merger has a detrimental e⁄ect on outside (independent
B-country) ￿rms.
13The set of remaining candidate equilibria, containing four elements, is illustrated
in Figure 5, alongside the conditions on the reduced-form functions in the left-hand
margin. The equilibria are labelled (a), (c1), (c2) and (h), in a manner consistent with
the labelling of equilibria in Section 2. In view of Lemma 1, only three merger surplus
functions need be computed in parameter space P: ￿I, ￿II and ￿III. By inspecting the
signs of these functions in P, the game can be solved.
The solution to the game is stated in the next proposition. It states that all four
remaining candidate equilibria occur in space P. Figure 6 partitions the space into
four disjoint zones, each labelled after the equilibrium which can be supported for the
combinations of parameters de￿ning the zone. Thus, for low enough values of both
the quality gap v and the (normalised) trade cost ~ t, in zone (h), the ￿unpro￿tability
of mergers￿result common to models with quantity competition and in the absence of
merger ￿synergies￿(Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983) is obtained. Here, along the
equilibrium path, as well as in subgames hanging from nodes o⁄ the equilibrium path,
no cross-border merger occurs. At the other end, for high enough values of v and/or ~ t,
in zone (a), mergers are always pro￿table: along the equilibrium path, as well as o⁄ it,
cross-border mergers always occur. For intermediate values of v and/or ~ t, in zones (c1)
and (c2), mergers again occur along the equilibrium path. Here, however, the merger
decisions in the early stages of the merger game have a bearing on the merger decisions
in the later stages.
Proposition 3 Space P can be partitioned into four disjoint zones, as depicted in Figure
6. A straight line segment drawn from (v;~ t) = (1;0) to any point on ~ t = 3￿2v
2v begins in
zone (h), crossing into zone (c2), followed by zone (c1) and ending in zone (a). In each
zone, the unique equilibrium is given in Figure 5, labelled after the zone. The boundaries
between zones (h) and (c2), between zones (c2) and (c1), and between zones (c1) and
(a), are continuous and downward-sloping, joining a point (v;0), 1 < v < 3
2, on the v-
axis to a point (1;~ t), 0 < ~ t < 1
2, on the ~ t-axis. The boundary between zones (h) and (c2)
lies strictly below the boundary between zones (c2) and (c1), which in turn lies strictly
below the boundary between zones (c1) and (a).
Intuition and decomposition analysis (A decomposition analysis of the pro￿tabil-
ity of a merger provides intuition on the results of Proposition 3. The reader may wish
to skip to Section 3.2 without loss of continuity. Proof of the proposition is set out in
Appendix B.) How the total e⁄ect of a single cross-border merger (say, a stand-alone
￿rst merger that shifts market structure from r0 to r1
24) on the pro￿t of insiders changes
as v and ~ t vary can be broken down in a simple way into three e⁄ects. The ￿rst e⁄ect,
labelled the ￿insider output contraction￿e⁄ect, is calculated assuming a merger tech-
nology where there is no quality upgrade in the production facilities located in country
B as a result of the merger, and further that outsiders do not react to the merger by
increasing output, but rather maintain their pre-merger output levels. This pro￿t e⁄ect
24By ￿stand-alone￿I am considering the pro￿tability of a ￿rst merger in isolation, abstracting from
whether it is followed by further mergers and therefore from whether r1 is an equilibrium market
structure.
14is unambiguously positive25 for (v;~ t) 2 P. A merger internalises the externality each
constituent insider confers upon the other when making an output decision (the insiders￿
reaction function shifts inward); as a result, the (quality-adjusted26) combined output
of insiders falls, prices of high and low-quality goods rise in both countries and insider
pro￿ts rise.
The second pro￿t e⁄ect, labelled the ￿technology transfer￿e⁄ect, still assumes that
outsiders￿output remains unchanged upon merger, but now the merger technology as-
sumed in the model, that quality of B-country production facilities jumps from uB to
uA through merger, is re-established. This e⁄ect is also unambiguously positive: insider
pro￿ts on sales in country B rise as a result of the transfer of technology27. By this
e⁄ect, insiders expand the (quality-adjusted) quantity sold in country B (with prices
in country B falling), yet this increase in sales in country B does not o⁄set the output
contraction in country B as a result of the ￿rst e⁄ect (the net e⁄ect on country B prices
is positive).
The positive ￿insider output contraction￿and ￿technology transfer￿e⁄ects on the
pro￿t of insiders are countervailed by a negative ￿outsider output expansion￿e⁄ect. This
third e⁄ect captures the impact on the pro￿t of insiders of allowing outsiders to respond
to the merger. Since quantities are strategic substitutes, outsiders to a merger free ride
on insiders￿output contraction (the equilibrium moves out along the outsiders￿reaction
function as the insiders￿reaction function shifts inward). As outsiders￿(quality-adjusted)
output increases, insiders react by further contracting output, to which outsiders further
expand output, and so on, until equilibrium is reached. This third e⁄ect on insiders￿
pro￿t is unambiguously negative.
The overall impact of the cross-border merger on the pro￿t of insiders turns on
the relative magnitude of the countervailing e⁄ects. Intuitively, the ￿outsider output
expansion￿e⁄ect is increasingly negative (outsiders￿output expansion increasingly high)
as v and/or ~ t falls: for (v;~ t) su¢ ciently close to (1;0), this negative e⁄ect on the pro￿t
of insiders dominates the two positive e⁄ects and the stand-alone merger is unpro￿table.
To see this, note that at (v;~ t) = (1;0), with no quality asymmetries and no trade costs,
with six ￿rms competing in each country on an equal footing28, output expansion by
outsiders is at its most severe, rendering a merger at its most unpro￿table for insiders.
25Insider pro￿ts rise on sales in both countries. Under this modi￿ed merger technology, it can be
shown that when v > 1 + ~ t the merged ￿rm discontinues production operations in country B, shipping
high-quality product produced in country A to country B. When v < 1 + ~ t, the merged ￿rm no longer
cross-ships, producing low-quality product in country B for domestic consumption.
26Quality-adjusted output is de￿ned as output multiplied by the quality gap v = uA
uB for product
of high quality uA when in competition with product of low quality uB, and output multiplied by 1
otherwise. This measure of output is natural in view of the inverse demand functions (e.g. see equation
(3)).
27Clearly, there is no e⁄ect on sales, prices and pro￿t on sales in country A. As in the model, the
merged ￿rm now produces high-quality product in country B for domestic consumption. This e⁄ect
could alternatively be called the ￿(insider) trade cost elimination￿e⁄ect. The upgrade in quality of B-
country facilities has an equivalent e⁄ect to the elimination of trade costs on cross-hauling by insiders:
by eliminating trade costs insiders would produce only high-quality product in country A, which is
equivalent to producing high-quality product in both countries for domestic consumption when trade
costs are present. Indeed this is an example of the symmetry of the model with respect to v and ~ t.
28Recall that I am analysing the pro￿tability of a stand-alone ￿rst cross-border merger for the purpose
of motivating intuition.
15The equilibrium outcomes of the sequential game at di⁄erent parameter values can
then be understood by reference to these e⁄ects. In zone (h), where v and ~ t are both
low, the output expansion by outsiders in response to a merger would be signi￿cant,
while the advantage enjoyed by the multinational of producing with high quality in both
countries and no longer cross-hauling product between them would be limited. Being
an outsider in the event of a merger is highly pro￿table. As a result, no cross-border
merger occurs along the equilibrium path.
At the other end, for high enough values of v and/or ~ t, in zone (a), mergers are
always pro￿table: along the equilibrium path, as well as o⁄ it, cross-border mergers
always occur. Under high v and/or ~ t, the output expansion by outsiders to a merger is
limited. To see why this is so for su¢ ciently high v even when ~ t is close to zero, note that
starting from a market structure with no cross-border merger, there are e⁄ectively only
three (high-quality, A-country) ￿rms selling in each country. If only one cross-border
merger is now allowed to occur, the number of ￿rms e⁄ectively selling in each country
remains unchanged, hence the limited output expansion by outsiders. To see why there
is limited output expansion by outsiders for su¢ ciently high ~ t even when v is close to
1, note that again a cross-border merger leaves the number of ￿rms e⁄ectively selling in
each market unchanged (three A-country ￿rms selling in country A and three B-country
￿rms selling in country B). When v and ~ t are greater than 1 and 0 respectively, the
technology transfer e⁄ect is present: there is the added gain from merging arising from
upgrading the production facilities located in country B to the higher level of quality.
For intermediate values of v and/or ~ t, mergers again occur along the equilibrium
path. Here, however, early mergers induce subsequent mergers. In zone (c2), along the
equilibrium path, ￿rms 1 and 4￿ s merger is decisive for ￿rms 2 and 5 to merge, and both
mergers are in turn decisive for ￿rms 3 and 6 to merge. Stated loosely, more mergers
mean less free riding by outsiders in the market competition stage. Notice that if, say,
￿rms 1 and 4 were not to anticipate the e⁄ect their merger has on subsequent merger
decisions, but viewed their merger in isolation, they would not merge since ￿I < 0 in
zone (c2)29. In zone (c1), earlier mergers are still decisive for later mergers. However,
due to higher v and/or ~ t compared to zone (c2), and hence lower output expansion
by outsiders, only one previous decision to merge su¢ ces for ￿rms 3 and 6 to ￿nd it
pro￿table to choose likewise.
3.2 Discussion: Foreign investment literature and robustness
In this subsection results are discussed in light of the international trade and investment
literature. Considerations are also made on the speci￿cation of the extensive form of the
merger game and the number of merger stages.
The trade literature has modelled foreign direct investment (FDI) mostly in the
form of green￿eld investment, where ￿rms choose between exporting to a market and
setting up production facilities in that market; see for example Motta (1994), who studies
green￿eld investment in a similar vertically-di⁄erentiated global oligopoly. The literature
29In an international oligopoly in the presence of technological innovation, Graham (1985) suggests
that a ￿rm￿ s motivation for foreign direct investment may be ￿to respond to or anticipate the action of
a rival... creating a clustering of DFI (foreign direct investment) in the industry￿(pp. 69; parenthesis
added).
16has emphasised the tari⁄-jumping (more precisely, trade-cost-jumping) rationale behind
FDI: unless trade costs are su¢ ciently low, runs the argument, it may be rational for
a ￿rm to set up foreign production operations. On the one hand, green￿eld investment
requires a ￿xed setup cost but, on the other hand, it enables ￿rms to reduce variable
(trade) cost.
Yet empirically, the major channel by which foreign investment is made is that of
mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 2000). By analysing investment in this mode, in
counterpoint to green￿eld investment, my model points out that cross-border mergers
allow ￿rms not only to save on trade costs and transfer technology but also, by reducing
the number of rivals, to enjoy muted competition. It explores a di⁄erent mechanism to
the tari⁄-jumping rationale of why foreign investment may not occur when trade costs
(and the quality gap) are low: one where the pro￿tability of investment turns on the
response of non-participating ￿rms in a Cournot oligopoly. In such situations where
there is low product di⁄erentiation along both horizontal and vertical dimensions, any
cross-border merger would be met with a ￿erce output response by those producers not
party to the merger.
An example is in order. Analysing the substitution-of-exports-for-green￿eld-investment
decision, Motta (1994) ￿nds that a decrease in the value of the exporting cost, ceteris
paribus, results ￿in an enlargement of the regions (in parameter space) where exports,
rather than investments, prevail￿(pp.191). This is supported in my model of acquisition
investment (in Figure 6 the boundary between zones (h) and (c2) is downward-sloping),
yet owing to a di⁄erent mechanism. Motta￿ s result derives from tari⁄-jumping: the lower
is the trade cost, ceteris paribus, the lower are the gains from (green￿eld) investment.
In my model, the lower is the trade cost, ceteris paribus, the greater is the intensity of
competition and the higher are the gains to the industry from (acquisition) investment
(see below). Yet it is precisely when the trade cost is low that free riding on other
mergers is so pro￿table that in equilibrium no (acquisition) investment occurs.
Clearly, for parameter values in all zones including zone (h), the ￿grand cross-border
coalition￿￿where three cross-border mergers occur and there are no independent ￿rms
￿is the structure under which industry pro￿ts are maximal30. In fact, it is in zone (h),
where both v and ~ t are low enough, that the industry gains from merging31 are greatest:
intuitively, the lower is v or the lower is ~ t, the greater is the intensity of competition
resulting in lower industry pro￿ts under r0, and therefore the higher are the gains to
be reaped from eliminating competitors through merger. Despite this, in zone (h) free
riding on a merger is ￿far too￿pro￿table and intense. Due to this prisoner￿ s dilemma
character of the game in this zone, the three-merger outcome cannot be supported in
equilibrium.
Modelling foreign investment in the form of cross-border mergers suggests just how
widespread such activity may be. While it is di¢ cult to rationalise green￿eld investment
when there are no trade costs (~ t = 0), since location of production does not matter, cross-
border mergers will occur when the quality gap is high enough: there exist (v;~ t) 2 P
30When (v;~ t) = (3
2;0) or (1; 1
2), the grand cross-border coalition is weakly dominant. Otherwise it is
strictly dominant for (v;~ t) 2 P.
31Note that the industry gains from merging is the di⁄erence between pro￿ts under market structure
r3 and pro￿ts under r0, i.e. 3￿V I(v;~ t). That these are monotonically decreasing in ~ t, for a given v, and
monotonically decreasing in v, for a given ~ t, is intuitive and can be shown.
17in zones (a), (c1) and (c2) when ~ t = 0 and v exceeds certain thresholds. Thus the
existence of a (large enough) quality gap is a su¢ cient condition for mergers to occur,
unlike the case of a simple green￿eld investment model, where ~ t > 0 is also necessary.
As with mergers in general, via cross-border mergers ￿rms can dampen competition.
My model further predicts the phenomenon of investment-bunching. When cross-border
mergers occur they do not happen in isolation: (Merger, Merger, Merger)32 is the unique
equilibrium outcome for most parameter values with the exception of low values for the
quality gap and the trade cost.
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the sequential game with
those of a di⁄erent game, where the three merger decisions are made simultaneously in
a ￿rst stage followed by a market competition stage, as before. As seen above, in the
sequential-move game, (Merger, Merger, Merger) is the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SPNE) outcome for parameter values in zones (a), (c1) and (c2), while (No
Merger, No Merger, No Merger) is the unique SPNE outcome in zone (h). Consider now
the simultaneous-move game. In each zone the same outcome as that in the sequential
game can be supported in equilibrium. Yet in zones (c1) and (c2), this equilibrium
outcome is no longer unique: in addition to (Merger, Merger, Merger), (No Merger, No
Merger, No Merger) is also a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome.
The set of equilibrium outcomes in the simultaneous-move game is thus a (strict, in
zones (c1) and (c2)) superset of the set of equilibrium outcomes in the sequential game.
By modelling the merger decisions sequentially, the no-merger outcome which could
be supported as a second equilibrium outcome in zones (c1) and (c2) were the merger
decisions to be modelled simultaneously, no longer survives. The sequential nature of
moves acts as a coordination device, and may help explain the empirical observation of
widespread, and bunched together in time, cross-border mergers33.
Some ￿nal remarks pertaining to the number of merger stages. One may ask how
robust is the result of widespread cross-border mergers in equilibrium to the number of
merger stages (for a game with T merger stages, modifying the setup by, say, embedding
each country initially with T independent ￿rms). Consider ￿rst the game with two
merger stages (and two ￿rms in each country), i.e. T = 2. Similar results to those of
Figure 5 (where T = 3) obtain, with one exception. A zone like (h) in Figure 5, where
mergers are unpro￿table and do not occur along the equilibrium path, is no longer
obtained. For v and ~ t as low as 1 and 0 respectively, mergers already occur along the
equilibrium path; speci￿cally, for (v;~ t) = (1;0), a merger wave (in the sense of set (c) in
Figure 3) obtains34. Intuitively, there are at most two non-participating ￿rms to each
32By this representation I mean that all three cross-border mergers are carried out: ￿rms 1 and 4
merge, ￿rms 2 and 5 merge and ￿rms 3 and 6 merge.
33In the speci￿cation of the sequential game, I could have explicitly modelled each merger stage as
two separate stages, a bidding stage by one of the two constituent ￿rms, the ￿bidder￿ , followed by an
acceptance stage by the other constituent ￿rm, the ￿target￿ . (This is done by Fauli-Oller (2000), for
example, who equips low-cost ￿rms with the ability to place ￿take-it-or-leave-it￿bids to merge with
high-cost ￿rms.) Had I done this, the same merger outcomes would be obtained in equilibrium, with the
observation that the surplus from merger would be captured by the bidder. In this case, one can show
that the sequential nature of the merger game, for parameter values in zone (c2), lowers the average
bid accepted in equilibrium by the target ￿rms vis-￿-vis the game where all three merger decisions are
made simultaneously (see also Kamien and Zang 1990, 1993). Merging sequentially can thus lower the
cost of setting up multinational ￿rms and reducing competition.
34This contrasts with the result in Fauli-Oller (2000) that a ￿takeover wave￿occurs only for a su¢ -
ciently large (cost) di⁄erence among ￿rms.
18merger (as opposed to four when T = 3) and thus the ￿outsider output expansion￿e⁄ect
is never negative enough to ￿undo￿the pro￿tability of merging for participating parties.
As for solving the game when the number of merger stages T ￿ 4, Appendix B
provides expressions for the reduced-form pro￿t functions of the di⁄erent ￿rms, under
the di⁄erent possible market structures, in a game with T merger stages: from these the
merger surplus functions are computed. As T increases, the space P of parameters (v;~ t)
shrinks: the downward-sloping boundary at which two-way trade is just feasible shifts
inward towards the ￿origin￿(1;0). One can show that the unpro￿tability-of-mergers
result for parameter values close enough to, and including, (1;0) (similar to equilibrium
(h) in Figure 5), and the pro￿tability-of-mergers result for parameter values close enough
to, and including, the two-way-trade boundary (similar to equilibrium (a) in Figure 5)
carry through for this general case. As with the case where T = 3, it can further be
shown that for all parameter combinations outside P (where trade may ￿ ow only from
country A to country B, or not at all), mergers are pro￿table; a similar equilibrium to
(a) in Figure 5 obtains. In sum, the main results of the particular T = 3 game analysed
carry through more generally, namely that (i) cross-border mergers may be unpro￿table
only when both the quality gap and the trade cost are low, and (ii) the pro￿tability of
cross-border mergers is widespread, with such mergers bunching together.
4 Example 2: Cross-border mergers in the Perry
and Porter (1985) model
I now analyse cross-border merger pro￿tability in another standard model that satis￿es
the su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1, yet where the motive for merger is di⁄erent in
kind. Perry and Porter (1985) introduce a notion of ￿￿rm size￿by considering a ￿xed
factor of production (say capital) whose total supply is ￿xed to the industry; what
distinguishes one ￿rm from another is the stock of capital it owns. Thus, a ￿larger￿
￿rm arising from the merger of two ￿rms owning the same amount of capital has a
lower marginal cost than either of its constituents at a given level of output (to be made
precise below).
Perry and Porter (1985) setup Let k > 0 denote the amount of the ￿xed factor of
production whose total supply is ￿xed to an industry producing a homogeneous good.
Firm i￿ s cost function is given by C(xi;ki), where xi denotes its output of this good and ki
is the amount of the ￿xed factor it owns. The cost function is taken to be homogeneous
of degree one in output and capital, implying constant returns to scale and that the
marginal cost function, C1(x;k) :=
@C(x;k)
@x , is homogeneous of degree zero in x and k.
Because of the presence of a ￿xed factor of production, it is assumed that marginal costs
are decreasing in k, C12(x;k) :=
@2C(x;k)
@k@x < 0 and hence, by Euler￿ s theorem, marginal
costs are increasing in output, C11(x;k) :=
@2C(x;k)
@x2 > 0. Firms compete ￿ la Cournot.
Perry and Porter (1985) specify particular functional forms for demand and cost.
Both price and marginal cost are assumed to be linear functions of output. The industry
inverse demand function is given by P(X) = a ￿ X, where P is price and X :=
P
i xi
is industry output. (I adapt this to the two-country setting by taking P l(Xl) = a￿Xl,
19where P l and Xl are respectively the price and sales in country l 2 fA;Bg.) A ￿rm￿ s cost




i ki are distributed in proportion to capital ownership. Coe¢ cients d, e
and g are (weakly) positive and a > d. (In this two-country setting, I again assume a
linear trade technology: exports incur a unit trade cost t ￿ 0.)
Sequential cross-border merger game I take the simplest structure of the sequen-
tial merger game considered in Section 2. The (global) industry, with capital stock 4k,
consists of four symmetric ￿rms, each owning one-quarter of this stock, ki = k, each
country hosting two ￿rms, nA = nB = 2. With no loss of generality, ￿rms in country A
are labelled 1 and 2, their B-country rivals are labelled 3 and 4, the ￿rst set of ￿rms that
decide whether to merge is M1 = f1;3g and the set of ￿rms that subsequently decide
whether to merge is M2 = f2;4g. The merger technology is such that the capital stock
of a merged (multinational) ￿rm is the sum of the capital stock of its constituent ￿rms.
Notice that the assumptions rule out economies of scale as a motive for merger.
4.1 Equilibria as a function of the rate of change of marginal
cost and the trade cost
In view of the symmetry (in the sense of De￿nition 2), I resort to Proposition 2 in
order to solve the game. The reduced-form pro￿t functions for an independent ￿rm and
merged ￿rm under every possible market structure, necessary to compute the merger
surplus functions, are derived in Appendix C. The merger surplus functions ￿ are a
function of (i) the demand intercept less the marginal cost when output is zero, (a￿d),
(ii) the trade cost t, and (iii) the rate of change of the marginal cost of a ￿rm with
capital stock k, C11(x;k) = e
k. Nevertheless, the ￿-functions can be unambiguously
signed, pinning down the equilibria of the game, by ~ e := e
k and ~ t := t
a￿d, which I will
refer to, respectively, as the rate of change of the marginal cost and the (normalised)
trade cost.
Clearly, the space of parameter values of interest is that where trade between coun-
tries is feasible. (Otherwise there is zero surplus from merger.) Again I label this space
P, de￿ned by ~ e ￿ 0 and (0 ￿)~ t ￿ 1
3+~ e.
The su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1 holds It is easy to show that the model
satis￿es the su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1, implying that of the six possible equilibria
depicted in Figure 3 for a symmetric game with two merger stages, only three equilibria
can obtain: sets of strategies (a), (c) and (h). Inspection of (the sign of) the merger
surplus functions ￿I and ￿II in parameter space establishes that all three equilibria do
obtain. Further, the way in which the equilibrium changes as parameters vary is similar
to Example 1 (Section 3). When the rate of change of the marginal cost ~ e and the trade
cost ~ t are both low, no cross-border merger occurs along the equilibrium path of the
game, as well as o⁄ it: set (h) is the equilibrium. At the other end, for high enough
values of ~ e and/or ~ t, mergers are pro￿table, along the equilibrium path as well as o⁄ it:
set (a) is the equilibrium. For intermediate values of ~ e and/or ~ t, mergers occur along
the path yet the early merger by M1-￿rms induces the subsequent merger by M2-￿rms:
20set (c) is the equilibrium. The zones in which the di⁄erent strategies are supported as
equilibria are labelled accordingly as zones (a), (c) and (h). The complementary sets of
strategies in Figure 3, namely (d), (e) and (f), cannot be supported as equilibria for any
combination of parameters. The following proposition summarises the result.
Proposition 4 Space P can be partitioned into three disjoint zones, as depicted in Fig-
ure 7. A straight line segment drawn from (~ e;~ t) = (0;0) to any point on ~ t = 1
3+~ e begins
in zone (h), crossing into zone (c) and ending in zone (a). In each zone, the unique
equilibrium is given in Figure 3, labelled after the zone. The boundaries between zones
(h) and (c), and between zones (c) and (a), are continuous and downward-sloping, join-
ing a point (~ e;0), 0 < ~ e < 1, on the ~ e-axis to a point (0;~ t), 0 < ~ t < 1
3, on the ~ t-axis.
The boundary between zones (h) and (c) lies strictly below the boundary between zones
(c) and (a).
The parallel to Proposition 3 is clear, both results being driven by a similar underlying
mechanism (the reaction of non-participating ￿rms), despite the motive for merger being
di⁄erent in kind: ￿growth in size￿ presently as opposed to ￿technology transfer￿ in
Section 3, in addition to dampening competition and jumping tari⁄s, which both models
share. That the response of non-participating ￿rms again takes centre-stage in explaining
the pro￿tability of cross-border mergers is intuitive. When both the rate of increase of
marginal cost and the trade cost are low, non-participating ￿rms respond to a merger
by signi￿cantly expanding output, rendering the merger unpro￿table to its participants.
As either the rate of increase of marginal cost or the trade cost increase from these low
levels, the ￿outsider output expansion￿e⁄ect (see the decomposition analysis in Section
3) falls in magnitude and merger pro￿tability increases. As in Example 1, cross-border
mergers are widespread and do not occur in isolation, but rather bunch together.
5 Revisiting the vertically-di⁄erentiated-industry model:
Investment integration and ￿xed costs of merger
The solutions to the two standard models above share the common phenomenon that
cross-border mergers are undertaken and bunch together for a ￿large￿region of parame-
ter space. These results, however, beg the question: if the all-merger outcome indeed
occurs along the equilibrium path for these parameter values, why is it that cross-border
mergers are often empirically observed to occur from a sudden point in time onwards
(and usually concentrated over a short period)? In other words, why were they not
undertaken earlier?35
I revisit the vertically-di⁄erentiated-industry model in Section 3 to introduce the
notion of a ￿xed cost G associated with implementing a cross-border merger. Borrowing
from the historical motivation for the quality asymmetry in the model, I ask why do
35In particular, one setting in which this ￿ urry of investment activity has been seen to happen is
that of countries undergoing integration, such as the European Union (EEC) from the 1980s, or several
newly-industrialised countries undergoing trade and investment reform during the 1990s.
21cross-border mergers not take place even before countries undergo unexpected trade and
investment integration36?
I argue that initially, before countries open up their industries to foreign investment,
or lift curbs on the right of foreign ￿rms to acquire shares in domestic ￿rms, this ￿xed
cost G of implementing a cross-border merger is very high, to the extent that cross-
border mergers are not pro￿table and no merger occurs along the equilibrium path.
Then, as countries open up to foreign investment, with the relaxation of these curbs
on the right of foreign ￿rms to merge with (or acquire) domestic ￿rms, and the cost of
doing business (such as acquiring information, or communicating) in a new environment
declining as barriers are pulled down, G falls gradually37. In the historical context, the
point in time at which G begins to fall corresponds to the moment at which unexpected
integration takes place.
I investigate how the solution to the model, for the di⁄erent zones in (v;~ t) 2 P,
changes as the ￿xed cost G associated with implementing a cross-border merger declines
from an initial high level G0 (at which mergers do not occur). Figure 8 illustrates the
solution for (v;~ t) in each of zones (a), (c1) and (c2) as G falls38. When G reaches
a threshold given by ￿III(v;~ t), the equilibrium outcome (Merger, Merger, Merger) is
reestablished for (v;~ t) in each of zones (a), (c1) and (c2). Interestingly, when this
threshold G = ￿III(v;~ t) is reached, the equilibrium for (v;~ t) in each of zones (a), (c1)
and (c2) (the second game tree from top to bottom in Figure 8) replicates the equilibrium
for zone (c2) in the absence of ￿xed costs, depicted in Figure 5, which was referred to
as a ￿merger wave￿ 39 40.
36By the results of that section, mergers are pro￿table in autarky (outside P for ~ t high enough) in
the presence of a quality gap (v > 1).
37According to UNCTAD (2000), ￿over the period 1991-1999, 94% of the 1,035 changes worldwide
in the laws governing FDI created a more favourable framework for FDI. Complementing the more
welcoming national FDI regimes, the number of bilateral investment treaties ￿concluded increasingly
also between developing countries ￿has risen from 181 at the end of 1980 to 1,856 at the end of 1999.
Double taxation treaties have also increased, from 719 in 1980 to 1,982 at the end of 1999. At the
regional and interregional levels, an increasing number of agreements (most recently between the EC
and Mexico) are helping create an investment environment more conducive to international investment
￿ ows￿(pp.xv). See also Caves (1991).
38The proof is in Appendix B. Clearly, in zone (h), no cross-border mergers occur along the equilibrium
path for all values of G ￿ 0: if this was the case in the absence of ￿xed costs of implementation (G = 0),
it remains the case when these are introduced (G > 0).
39A relevant question at this point is: if ￿rms forsee that G will fall further, why not wait for this
to occur and thus guarantee a larger surplus from merger? Though this can be ruled out by making
￿rms (su¢ ciently) impatient in a dynamic setting, or unable to forsee the future trajectory of G, the
relevance of the question remains.
40As G falls further, assuming no mergers have occurred, for ￿I(v;~ t) < G ￿ ￿II(v;~ t), the equilibria
in zones (a) and (c1) (see the third tree in Figure 8) replicate the equilibrium for zone (c1) in the absence
of ￿xed costs (the equilibrium in zone (c2) still replicates the equilibrium for zone (c2) in the absence
of ￿xed costs). For 0 ￿ G ￿ ￿I(v;~ t), assuming no mergers have occurred, the equilibrium in zone (a)
(see the fourth tree in Figure 8) replicates the equilibrium for zone (a) in the absence of ￿xed costs (the
equilibria in zones (c1) and (c2) still replicate the equilibria for zones (c1) and (c2) respectively in the
absence of ￿xed costs).
226 Concluding remarks
This paper has sought to explain why the pattern of equilibria in sequential (horizontal)
merger games of a certain type studied in the literature is similar across a fairly wide
class of models. In this class of models typically only a similar subset of the possible set
of equilibria is obtained. By developing general conditions characterising each possible
equilibrium, I have shown that the solution to models that exhibit symmetry (in the sense
de￿ned earlier) and satisfy a certain su¢ cient condition will be restricted to this subset
of equilibria. These models capture two (commonly) alternative types of situation: (i)
one where ￿rms are better o⁄under market structures where their rivals have merged as
against market structures where rivals remain independent, or (ii) one where by merging
￿rms may gain a competitive edge over their rivals. This result is of empirical relevance
in that the pattern of equilibria found for this class of models is associated with mergers
not happening in isolation but rather bunching together.
I have then employed the general analysis to solve two other standard models where
the su¢ cient condition holds, illustrating that despite the motive for merger being dif-
ferent in kind ￿one where mergers are a means of technology transfer, the other where
mergers enable ￿rms to grow their holdings of capital ￿the pattern of equilibria is again
similar. In so doing, I have utilised a two-country setting to show that the results can
easily be extended to cross-border mergers. I argued that sequential games can be used
to explore the the pro￿tability of cross-border mergers and can cast light on the phe-
nomenon of bunching. Cross-border mergers are widespread and bunching occurs for
￿most￿combinations of parameter values. The occurrence of mergers hinges critically
on the magnitude of the reaction by non-participating ￿rms being limited (e.g. when
there is su¢ cient di⁄erentiation along either vertical or horizontal dimensions, as in the
￿rst model).
Much research to date on foreign investment has studied the export versus green￿eld
investment decision by ￿rms as countries undergo market integration. Such models as-
sume that as borders open up and there is increased competition, ￿rms decide whether
to enter new markets via exports or by setting up production operations, concentrate
on existing markets or exit altogether. In reality, oligopolistic ￿rms have a larger ac-
tion set which includes merging with one another. Modelling foreign investment in the
form of cross-border mergers ￿in counterpoint to green￿eld investment ￿suggests just
how widespread such activity may be. By merging or buying their way into foreign
markets ￿rms can dampen competition, a feature which is absent in simple exports-
versus-green￿eld investment studies. This helps explain the empirical predominance of
mergers and acquisitions as a channel of investment by ￿rms in foreign markets.
Finally, modelling mergers in the form of a sequential game as opposed to a game
with simultaneous moves, captures the interdependence result ￿where earlier mergers
trigger subsequent mergers ￿holding for certain regions in parameter space. In these
regions the sequential nature of moves acts as a coordination device ensuring that the
all-merger equilibrium outcome is unique. This may further help explain the empirical
predominance and bunching of cross-border mergers.
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25A Appendix: Proof of Corollary 1 and other su¢ -
cient conditions that rule out Nash-strategy sets
(d), (e) and (f) as candidate equilibria, in the case
of symmetry
I begin by proving Corollary 1. Consider the ￿rst part of the su¢ cient condition, namely
that f￿ j ￿I(￿) ￿ 0g ￿ f￿ j ￿II(￿) ￿ 0g. It rules out sets (e) and (f) as candidate equi-
libria. To see this, notice that if either set (e) or set (f) forms an equilibrium, necessary
conditions from Proposition 2 are that ￿I ￿ 0 and ￿II < 0. Hence if whenever ￿I ￿ 0 it
happens that ￿II ￿ 0, i.e. if ￿II ￿ 0 j ￿I ￿ 0, then neither set (e) nor set (f) can form
an equilibrium. (Recall that, from the symmetry property, ￿I = ￿V and ￿II = ￿V I. ￿I
is thus the surplus from any merger in isolation. ￿II is thus the surplus from any merger
conditional on the merger of the rival set of ￿rms.) Now consider the second part of the
su¢ cient condition, namely that f￿ j ￿II(￿) ￿ 0g ￿ f￿ j ￿III(￿) ￿ 0g. It rules out set
(d) as a candidate equilibrium. To see this, notice that if set (d) forms an equilibrium,
necessary conditions are that ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿III < 0. Hence if whenever ￿II ￿ 0 it
happens that ￿III ￿ 0, i.e. if ￿III ￿ 0 j ￿II ￿ 0, then set (d) cannot form an equi-
librium. (Recall that, from the symmetry property, ￿M1;s3 = ￿M2;s3 and
P
i2M1 ￿i;s0 = P
i2M2 ￿i;s0, so that ￿III = ￿M1;s3 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s0 = ￿M2;s3 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s0. ￿III is thus
M1-￿rms￿or M2-￿rms￿di⁄erence in pro￿ts when two mergers are undertaken over no
merger being undertaken.) Q.E.D.
Inspection of Proposition 2 indicates other su¢ cient conditions that rule out Nash-
strategy sets (d), (e) and/or (f) as candidate equilibria. I provide three.
1. Set (d) is ruled out as an equilibrium if the sum of payo⁄s of independent ￿rms
in M1 (M2) is always lower under the fragmented market structure s0 (s0) than
under the more concentrated market structure s1 (s2), where the rival set of ￿rms
has merged.
Proof. If set (d) forms an equilibrium, necessary conditions from Proposition
2 are that ￿II ￿ 0 and ￿III < 0, i.e. ￿M2;s3 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s2 ￿ 0 and ￿M1;s3 ￿ P





i2M2 ￿i;s0 > ￿M1;s3 = ￿M2;s3 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s2 = P









(note that this occurs i⁄￿II ￿ ￿III) then set (d) cannot form an equilibrium. Note
that this condition and the second part of the su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1 are
based on the same necessary conditions from Proposition 2; they are not, however,
equivalent.
2. Set (e) is ruled out as an equilibrium if the payo⁄ to merged ￿rm M1 (M2) is
always lower under market structure s2 (s1), where the rival set of ￿rms has not
merged, than under the more concentrated market structure s3 (s3), where the two
mergers have been undertaken.
Proof. If set (e) forms an equilibrium, necessary conditions are that ￿II < 0 and
￿IV ￿ 0, i.e. ￿M2;s3 ￿
P
i2M2 ￿i;s2 < 0 and ￿M1;s2 ￿
P
i2M1 ￿i;s1 ￿ 0. Again,
from the de￿nition of symmetry, these are jointly equivalent to ￿M1;s2 = ￿M2;s1 ￿ P
i2M1 ￿i;s1 =
P
i2M2 ￿i;s2 > ￿M2;s3 = ￿M1;s3. Hence if ￿M1;s2 = ￿M2;s1 ￿
26￿M1;s3 = ￿M2;s3 (note that this occurs i⁄ ￿IV ￿ ￿II) then set (e) cannot form an
equilibrium.
3. Both set (e) and set (f) are ruled out as equilibria if the surplus from merging
in isolation, when positive, is always lower than when the rival set of ￿rms also
merges.
Proof. If either set (e) or set (f) forms an equilibrium, necessary conditions are
that ￿I ￿ 0 and ￿II < 0. Hence if whenever ￿I ￿ 0 it happens that ￿I ￿ ￿II,
i.e. if ￿I ￿ ￿II j ￿I ￿ 0, then neither set (e) nor set (f) can form an equilibrium.
(Recall that, from the symmetry property, ￿I = ￿V and ￿II = ￿V I. ￿I is thus
the surplus from any merger in isolation, i.e. when the rival set of ￿rms does not
merge. ￿II is thus the surplus from any merger conditional on the merger of the
rival set of ￿rms.) Notice that when this condition is satis￿ed, then the ￿rst part
of the su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1 is necessarily satis￿ed (but the reverse is
not true).
In addition to satisfying the su¢ cient condition of Corollary 1, which alone already
rules out sets (d), (e) and (f), it can be shown that the models of Examples 1 and 2
also satisfy su¢ cient conditions 1-3 just stated. That is, for all admissible parameter
values, it holds that (1) ￿II ￿ ￿III, (2) ￿IV ￿ ￿II, and (3) whenever ￿I ￿ 0 it happens
that ￿I ￿ ￿II. For instance, consider the Perry and Porter (1985) model of Example
2 and su¢ cient conditions 1 and 2 just stated. For sets (d) and (e) respectively to be
supported in equilibrium, for some parameter values ￿rms would need to be better o⁄
under less concentrated market structures as against more concentrated ones: ￿rm M1
would need to be better o⁄under fM1;2;4g than under fM1;M2g, or ￿rm 1 would need
to be better o⁄ under f1;2;3;4g than under fM2;1;3g. This is not the case for any
combination of parameters and hence sets (d) and (e) can be ruled out as candidate
equilibria.
Another example, not mentioned elsewhere in this paper, is a⁄orded by Deneckere
and Davidson (1985)￿ s model of symmetrically di⁄erentiated goods with Bertrand compe-
tition. It is straightforward to solve the simple sequential merger game with two merger
stages for an industry initially with four homogeneous ￿rms and, say, M1 = f1;3g and
M2 = f2;4g. For the entire range of the substitutability parameter, it can be shown that
￿IV < 0 < ￿I < ￿II < ￿III. Therefore, not only is the su¢ cient condition of Corollary
1 satis￿ed, but the other su¢ cient conditions 1-3 just stated also hold. As such, sets
(d), (e) and (f) cannot be supported in equilibrium. Indeed, the Bertrand assumption
ensures that only set (a) obtains in equilibrium, with mergers taking place from each
node along the equilibrium path of the game and also from each node lying outside the
equilibrium path. Again, this result hinges on the response of non-participating ￿rms
to a merger. As Deneckere and Davidson (1985) have shown, reaction schedules under
competition in prices are typically upward-sloping, with non-participants to a merger
reacting to the participants￿price increase by themselves raising prices. (See also Levy
and Reitzes 1992.)
27B Appendix: Cross-border mergers in a vertically-
di⁄erentiated industry
B.1 Historical motivation: Derivation of the autarky equilib-
rium
In order to motivate the number of ￿rms in each country (three) and their respective
qualities (high quality uA for ￿rms located in country A and low quality uB for ￿rms
located in country B, such that v =
uA
uB ￿ 1), the equilibrium to the autarkic (long-
term) entry and investment game is derived41. Recall the two-stage game played in
each country: in a ￿rst stage, ￿rms simultaneously make entry and quality investment
decisions while, in a second stage, they engage in Cournot competition.
In the second (market) stage, given that n ￿rms have entered in the ￿rst (entry and
investment) stage with qualities u = (uj), j = 1;:::;n, the gross pro￿t of ￿rm i (recalling
the price-to-quality ratio ￿) is
￿i = pixi ￿ cxi = ￿uixi ￿ cxi
Firm i maximises ￿i taking the vector of qualities u from the earlier stage and xj, j 6= i,
as given. The ￿rst order condition is ￿ui + uixi
d￿
dxi ￿ c = 0, where from (2) we have
d￿
dxi = ￿ S
(
Pn


















Summing over j, we obtain
Pn





uj). Using expression (2), I can




uj). Substituting for ￿ in FOC (4), I
























Note that by labelling the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest quality as ￿rm 1, a necessary and su¢ -




n ￿ 142. I can further solve for the price and gross pro￿t:

















Note that price does not depend on market size and that pro￿t is increasing in quality
and does not depend on marginal cost at equilibrium.
41The speci￿cation here closely resembles Motta (1992) and the derivation follows Sutton (1998,
Appendix 15.1).
42That is, the lowest quality o⁄ering with positive sales has a quality that exceeds the harmonic mean
of the qualities of all o⁄erings multiplied by n
n￿1 (the latter approximates 1 for large n).
28I now turn to the entry and investment stage. Sutton (1991, c.3) proves that at




uj) = n, and for every ￿rm choosing to enter, output, price and gross pro￿t
collapse to:









￿i = ￿ =
S
n2 (10)
Recall from Section 3 that F(u) = u3, u ￿ 1. (The convexity of the ￿xed cost function
is chosen so that, in equilibrium, three ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to enter each country.) Net
pro￿t per ￿rm is given by ￿(n;u) = ￿(n) ￿ F(u) = S
n2 ￿ u3. The industry equilibrium,
where n ￿rms enter with quality u, is characterised by two conditions (Motta 1992):
(I) (Free entry) ￿(n;u) ￿ 0 (viability) and ￿(n + 1;u) < 0 (stability)
(II) (Optimal quality43) d￿
du = dF
du
By considering a deviant ￿rm i o⁄ering quality ui when all its rivals j 6= i o⁄er a






















1 < n ￿
q
S
[u(n)]3, condition (I) may then be rewritten as
r
3(n + 1)3




The only possible solution to this inequality is n = 3 and this does not depend on S45.
The autarky equilibrium is then given by equations (8) to (11), where n = nl = 3
￿rms enter in each country l 2 fA;Bg and the common quality, price, ￿rm output and



























43As in Motta (1992), I consider only internal solutions.
















u )3, and by evaluating this expression at ui = u the marginal bene￿t for the





The SOC is satis￿ed at the solution n = 3 (see below).
45This ￿non-convergence￿result is consistent with the ￿niteness property of many vertical product
di⁄erentiation models. The symmetry of the quality chosen by ￿rms at equilibrium is, however, less
common in the literature and hinges on the symmetry of consumer preferences and the assumption of
quantity as opposed to price competition (Shaked and Sutton 1983, Sutton 1991, Motta 1992).
29Given the assumption ul ￿ 1, I further assume that Sl > 81
8 . Quality is an increasing
function of market size so in view of the assumption that SA ￿ SB(> 81
8 ), quality o⁄ered
by ￿rms in country A is at least equal to that o⁄ered by their counterparts in country
B: uA ￿ uB(￿ 1).
B.2 Reduced-form pro￿t functions in game with T merger stages
and (initially) T independent ￿rms in each country
Consider the sequential cross-border merger game spelled out at the beginning of Section
3 yet embed each country initially with T independent ￿rms, T ￿ 2, and extend the game
to T merger stages. (The setup in Section 3 refers to the case T = 3. See B.2.1 below.)
Thus, the ￿rms located in country A (producing with quality uA) are labelled 1;2;3;:::;T
and the ￿rms located in country B (quality uB) are labelled T + 1;T + 2;T + 3;:::;2T.
In the same vein, in the ￿rst stage ￿rms 1 and T +1 decide whether to merge (if formed,
merged ￿rm is labelled M1), in the second stage ￿rms 2 and T + 2 decide whether
to merge (if formed, merged ￿rm is labelled M2), and so on, in sequence until stage T,
where ￿rms T and 2T are the last pair of ￿rms to undertake a merger decision (if formed,
merged ￿rm is labelled MT). The game ends at stage T + 1, the market competition
stage. Given the symmetry, the T + 1 possible market structures coming out of the T
merger stages are labelled r0;r1;r2;:::;rT where, as in Section 3, the subscript denotes
the number of cross-border mergers undertaken.
To solve for market competition equilibrium outcomes as a function of market struc-
ture, begin by considering market structure ri, where i = 1;2;3;:::;T ￿ 1, i.e. both
independent and merged (multinational) ￿rms exist (I will return to the ￿corner￿struc-
tures r0 and rT shortly). Speci￿cally, under market structure ri there are i multinational
￿rms, T ￿ i independent A-country ￿rms and T ￿ i independent B-country ￿rms.
By the merger-technology assumption, a multinational ￿rm produces at quality level
max(uA;uB) = uA not only in country A but also in country B. Clearly, given the unit
trade cost t ￿ 0, it will no longer trade between countries, meeting the demand for its
(high-quality) product in each country through domestic production46.











j denotes the price of the good produced by ￿rm j and
sold in country l. (Recall that the subscripts m, a and b denote a multinational ￿rm,
an independent A-country ￿rm and an independent B-country ￿rm, respectively.) This









b l 2 fA;Bg (13)
46This would not necessarily be the case were a merger not to lead to a quality upgrade in the
production facilities in country B. For a large enough quality ratio relative to the trade cost, it can
be shown that a multinational ￿rm would continue exporting high-quality product produced by its
A-country plant to country B, discontinuing production operations in country B. For example, when
T = 3 under market structure r1 (one multinational ￿rm and two independent ￿rms in each country),
this would happen if v > 1 + t
c. Otherwise, for v ￿ 1 + t
c, the multinational ￿rm would produce
high-quality product in country A for consumption in country A and produce low-quality product in
country B for consumption in country B.




high-quality goods (produced by multinational ￿rms and independent A-country ￿rms)
command a price premium relative to low-quality goods (produced by independent B-
country ￿rms).
With no loss of generality (solely for the purpose of labelling ￿rms), assume that
the i multinational ￿rms in market structure ri were formed in the ￿rst i merger stages.
Similar to equation (3), the inverse demand functions for a low-quality product in country





























The ￿rst term in the denominator corresponding to each market is the quality-adjusted
sales of the i multinational ￿rms in that market; the second and third terms respectively
refer to the quality-adjusted sales of the T ￿ i independent A-country ￿rms and the
T ￿ i independent B-country ￿rms in that market. The inverse demand functions for
high-quality product in both countries, pl
m = pl
a, l 2 fA;Bg, can then be obtained from
equation (13).
Each ￿rm￿ s optimisation problem can now be written. A merged multinational ￿rm




















taking all other ￿rms￿outputs as given. As in equation (2), writing the price-to-quality













, and the price-to-quality













, the optimisation problem








































































31where sales in country B are subject to the unit trade cost. This may be rewritten in
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Similarly, an independent B-country ￿rm b, b = T + i + 1;T + i + 2;:::;2T, located


































































Adding across all FOCs pertaining to market A (i FOCs (14) for the multinational
￿rms, T ￿ i FOCs (16) for the independent A-country ￿rms and T ￿ i FOCs (18) for



























T + (T ￿ i)v
v
+ (T ￿ i)t
￿￿
and noting that the LHS is simply
SA





2T ￿ (i + 1)
￿
c(T + (T ￿ i)v) + (T ￿ i)tv
v
￿
Similarly adding across all FOCs pertaining to market B (i FOCs (15), T ￿i FOCs (17)
and T ￿ i FOCs (19), ￿




2T ￿ (i + 1)
￿
c(T + (T ￿ i)v) + (T ￿ i)t
v
￿
32Substituting for the price-to-quality ratios in FOCs (14) through (19), sales per ￿rm
in each market are obtained:
xA
m = (2T ￿ (i + 1))SA
c((T￿i)v￿(T￿i￿1))+(T￿i)tv
(c(T+(T￿i)v)+(T￿i)tv)2 xB










b = (2T ￿ (i + 1))SAv
c(T￿(T￿1)v)￿(T￿1)tv
(c(T+(T￿i)v)+(T￿i)tv)2 xB
b = (2T ￿ (i + 1))SBv
c(T￿(T￿1)v)+(T￿i)t
(c(T+(T￿i)v)+(T￿i)t)2
Non-negativity constraints ￿ensuring that despite trade costs t ￿ 0 and quality asym-
metries v ￿ 1, all ￿rms command positive sales in both countries ￿can be summarised
as two parameter restrictions. The ￿low-enough-quality-ratio￿restriction follows from
requiring that low-quality B-country ￿rms are still able to sell in their home country
when imports are most competitive (t = 0): xB
b ￿ 0 () v ￿ T
T￿1 + T￿i
T￿1~ t which implies
v ￿ T
T￿1 when ~ t = 0 (recall ~ t = t
c). The ￿low-enough-trade-cost￿restriction ensures
that low-quality B-country ￿rms￿exports to country A are not priced out of the market:
xA
b ￿ 0 () ~ t ￿
T￿(T￿1)v
(T￿1)v . Denote by P the set of parameter values (v;~ t) satisfying
these two conditions47.
Prices are obtained noting that pl
b = ￿




l 2 fA;Bg. Finally, evaluating the objective functions at these sales and prices, pro￿ts





































The reduced-form pro￿t functions per ￿rm are thus the sum of the pro￿t components
in the two markets, e.g. for a multinational ￿rm, ￿m;ri = ￿A
m;ri + ￿B
m;ri.
While the derivation above was carried out for ￿intermediate￿ market structures
where both independent and multinational ￿rms exist, it similarly applies to structures r0
(where there are no multinational ￿rms) and rT (where there are no independent ￿rms).
It is easy to see that the reduced-form pro￿t functions (20) ￿as well as the outputs
and prices derived above) ￿also hold where applicable. In other words, ￿m;ri calculated
from (20) holds for i = 1;2;3;:::;T, while ￿a;ri and ￿b;ri hold for i = 0;1;2;:::;T ￿ 1.
47Formally, space P is de￿ned as f(v;~ t) 2 R2 j 1 ￿ v ￿ T
T￿1 and 0 ￿ ~ t ￿
T￿(T￿1)v
(T￿1)v g. Alternatively,
P can be de￿ned by the restrictions 0 ￿ ~ t ￿ 1




The reason why the analysis in Section 3 is con￿ned to P is simplicity. Lifting these parameter
restrictions adds little insight: extending the space of parameter values to f(v;~ t) 2 R2 j v ￿ 1 and
~ t ￿ 0g would enlarge zone (a), the zone where mergers are always pro￿table, both along and o⁄ the
equilibrium path of the game.
Proof of this claim is available from the author, but headway can be made by noting that, say, for
the case considered in Section 3 (i.e. T = 3): (i) independent B-country ￿rms do not command positive
sales even in their home country, xA
b = xB
b = 0, when v ￿ 3
2 + 3
2~ t and ~ t ￿ 0 under market structure r0,
or when v ￿ 3
2 +~ t and ~ t ￿ 0 under r1, or when v ￿ 3
2 + 1
2~ t and ~ t ￿ 0 under r2; (ii) trade is too expensive
even for A-country ￿rms, xB
a = xA
a = 0, when 1 ￿ v ￿ 2
3 + 2
3~ t under r0, or when 1 ￿ v ￿ 1
2 +~ t under r1,
or when 1 ￿ v ￿ 2~ t under r2. Note that for 3
2 + 1
2~ t ￿ v ￿ 2~ t under r2, only two (multinational) ￿rms
command positive sales in country B, unlike all other parameter combinations and market structures
where the number of ￿rms selling into each country is at least three.
33B.2.1 Market competition equilibrium outcomes as a function of market
structure (case T = 3)
The reduced-form pro￿t functions used to compute the merger surplus functions (Def-
inition 3) follow from plugging T = 3 in equations (20) for the general case considered
above (T merger stages and initially T independent ￿rms in each country). The space
of parameter values P follows similarly from the space derived for the general case.
In view of Lemma 1, I reproduce the three merger surplus functions which need to








































































B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Part (i) This proof amounts to verifying that for all (v;~ t) 2 P:
￿ ￿II(v;~ t) ￿ 0 whenever ￿I(v;~ t) ￿ 0,
￿ ￿III(v;~ t) ￿ 0 whenever ￿II(v;~ t) ￿ 0.
This is done separately for the merger surplus emanating from each market: a second




b;r0 denotes the terms in ￿I(v;~ t) corresponding to market A, obtained from equations
(20), for T = 3, and reproduced in B.2.1.
I begin with ￿I;A(v;~ t), ￿II;A(v;~ t) and ￿III;A(v;~ t). Consider a straight line segment
going from (v;~ t) = (1;0) to any point on ~ t = 3￿2v
2v , the boundary of P where the ￿low-
enough-trade-cost￿ restriction binds (i.e. xA
b = 0). By writing this line segment as
~ t = ￿(v ￿ 1), where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and 0 ￿ ￿(v ￿ 1) ￿ 3￿2v
2v , changes in v and ~ t along this
line segment parameterised by ￿ may be referred to simply as changes in v (for ￿ = 0
the line segment lies on the v-axis; for ￿ ! 1 the line segment lies on the ~ t-axis). I seek
to uncover how the functions48 ￿I;A, ￿II;A and ￿III;A change as I increase v along line
segment ￿ (i.e. jointly increasing ~ t such that ~ t = ￿(v￿1)) from the lower end v = 1 (i.e.
(v;~ t) = (1;0)) to the upper end de￿ned implicitly by ￿(v ￿ 1) = 3￿2v
2v (label this value
v = ￿ v; formally this label should carry the parameter ￿, omitted for simplicity). The
following may be veri￿ed. At the lower end of the line segment, when v = 1, all three
functions are negative. Intuitively, merging ￿rms￿surplus arising from any stand-alone
cross-border merger (be this the ￿rst, the second or the third) is negative: since both
v and ~ t are low, non-participating ￿rms respond to the merger by increasing output
considerably. At the upper end of the line segment, when v = ￿ v, all three functions
are equal to zero. Intuitively, since xA
b = 0, there is no surplus to be enjoyed on sales
in country A from cross-border mergers when B-country ￿rms￿exports to country A
are (just) priced out of the market. Prior to any merger, there are three ￿rms o⁄ering
48For simplicity we drop the arguments of the functions.
34quality v commanding positive sales in country A; after a merger this is unchanged. Now,
starting at v = 1 and increasing v along the line segment, ￿I;A, ￿II;A and ￿III;A each
increase continuously from negative values toward positive values, reaching a maximum,
then decreasing continuously toward zero when v = ￿ v. Label the ￿rst value of v at which
￿I;A is zero as v0
A, the ￿rst value of v at which ￿II;A is zero as v00
A, and the ￿rst value of
v at which ￿III;A is zero as v000
A (again the labels omit the reference to ￿ for simplicity).
One can verify that 0 < v000
A < v00
A < v0
A < ￿ v. Since this is true along any line segment
parameterised by ￿, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, the following result holds:
￿








(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿III;A(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿
￿ P (21)
It may also be veri￿ed that, in addition to intersecting at v = ￿ v, ￿II;A and ￿I;A cross
as they slope upwards at a point, labelled v
00￿0
A , which lies between 0 and v00
A. In other
words, ￿II;A ￿￿I;A = 0 at v = v
00￿0
A , where 0 < v
00￿0
A < v00
A. To the right of this point, for
v
00￿0
A < v < ￿ v, ￿II;A ￿ ￿I;A > 0, whereas to its left, for 0 ￿ v < v
00￿0
A , ￿II;A ￿ ￿I;A < 0.




A < ￿ v, the following (stronger) result holds:
￿




(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿II;A(v;~ t) ￿ ￿I;A(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿
(22)
It can further be veri￿ed that ￿III;A ￿ ￿II;A > 0 for 0 ￿ v < ￿ v (recall ￿III;A = ￿II;A
when v = ￿ v) and thus
8 (v;~ t) 2 P, ￿III;A(v;~ t) ￿ ￿II;A(v;~ t) ￿ 0 (23)
Turning now to the merger surplus terms in market B, the same results come through,
despite some di⁄erences in the corresponding functions which are detailed next. The
values of the functions ￿I;B, ￿II;B and ￿III;B are no longer zero for all (v;~ t) along the
border of P for which the ￿low-enough-trade-cost￿restriction binds. For these parameter
values, unlike in country A, B-country ￿rms still command positive sales in their home
country and hence there is surplus from merger to be made on sales in country B (i.e.
the functions are strictly positive), with two exceptions. One is when imports are at
their most competitive, (v;~ t) = (3
2;0), and B-country ￿rms command zero sales in their
home country (as they do abroad), in which case ￿I;B, ￿II;B and ￿III;B again equal zero.
The other situation along this border of P where these functions equal zero occurs when
(v;~ t) = (1; 1
2). Here, quality is symmetric and markets are e⁄ectively autarkic: cross-
border merger does not change the (e⁄ective) number of competitors in each market.
Now, starting at v = 1 and increasing v along any line segment parameterised by ￿,
￿I;B, ￿II;B and ￿III;B each increase continuously from negative values toward positive
values; whether the functions increase monotonically or whether they reach a (positive)
maximum before decreasing to a lower albeit positive value or zero when v = ￿ v depends
on the line segment parameterised by ￿. Labelling the lower and possibly only value
of v at which ￿I;B (￿II;B, ￿III;B) is zero as v0
B (v00
B, v000




B < ￿ v. Since this is true along any line segment parameterised by ￿,
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, a result analogous to (21) holds:
￿








(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿III;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿
￿ P (24)
35Similar to their country A counterparts, ￿II;B and ￿I;B cross as they slope upwards
at a point, labelled v
00￿0
B , which lies between 0 and v00
B. To the right of this point, for
v
00￿0
B < v < ￿ v, ￿II;B ￿￿I;B > 049, whereas to its left, for 0 ￿ v < v
00￿0
B , ￿II;B ￿￿I;B < 0.




B < ￿ v, the following (stronger) result holds:
￿




(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿II;B(v;~ t) ￿ ￿I;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿
(25)
It can further be veri￿ed that ￿III;B ￿ ￿II;B > 0 for 0 ￿ v < ￿ v50 and thus
8 (v;~ t) 2 P, ￿III;B(v;~ t) ￿ ￿II;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0 (26)








The results for both markets are now combined to conclude the proof. I wish to
show that for (v;~ t) such that ￿I(v;~ t) = ￿I;A(v;~ t) + ￿I;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0, then ￿II(v;~ t) =
￿II;A(v;~ t) + ￿II;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0. (I also need to show that for (v;~ t) such that ￿II(v;~ t) =
￿II;A(v;~ t) + ￿II;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0, then ￿III(v;~ t) = ￿III;A(v;~ t) + ￿III;B(v;~ t) ￿ 0. This is
postponed brie￿ y.) For (v;~ t) such that ￿I ￿ 0 this may be due to either of three
possibilities:
￿ ￿I;A ￿ 0 and ￿I;B ￿ 0. From (21), ￿I;A ￿ 0 =) ￿II;A ￿ 0, while from (24),
￿I;B ￿ 0 =) ￿II;B ￿ 0. Hence
￿




(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿II(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿
(27)
from which the ￿rst half of Lemma 1, part (i) follows.
￿ ￿I;A > 0, ￿I;B < 0 but ￿I;A + ￿I;B ￿ 0. Here, since ￿I;A > 0 and ￿I;B < 0, v
must be greater than v0
A but less than v0
B, i.e. v0
A < v < v0




A, whence it follows that v
00￿0
B < v and thus ￿II;B ￿ ￿I;B > 0. From (22),
￿I;A ￿ 0 implies that ￿II;A ￿ ￿I;A ￿ 0. Since ￿I;A + ￿I;B ￿ 0 it must be that
￿II;A + ￿II;B > 0 and result (27) follows.
￿ ￿I;A < 0, ￿I;B > 0 but ￿I;A + ￿I;B ￿ 0. Here, since ￿I;A < 0 and ￿I;B > 0, v
must be greater than v0
B but less than v0
A, i.e. v0
B < v < v0




B, whence it follows that v
00￿0
A < v and thus ￿II;A￿￿I;A > 0. Again, since
￿I;A + ￿I;B ￿ 0 it must be that ￿II;A + ￿II;B > 0 and result (27) follows.
I now show that for (v;~ t) such that ￿II = ￿II;A + ￿II;B ￿ 0, it must be that
￿III = ￿III;A + ￿III;B ￿ 0. The proof is a simpli￿ed version of the previous one,
and follows from noting by (23) and (26) that 8 (v;~ t) 2 P, ￿III;A ￿ ￿II;A ￿ 0 and
￿III;B ￿ ￿II;B ￿ 0. Thus the counterpart to result (27) for the second half of Lemma 1
is obtained:
￿




(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿III(v;~ t) ￿ 0
￿
(28)
49￿II;B ￿ ￿I;B > 0 for v
00￿0
B < v ￿ ￿ v when 0 < ￿ < 1; i.e. only when ￿ = 0 or ￿ ! 1 does
￿II;B ￿ ￿I;B = 0 when v = ￿ v.
50The previous footnote similarly applies: only when ￿ = 0 or ￿ ! 1 does ￿III;B ￿ ￿II;B = 0 when
v = ￿ v.
36Summarising results (27) and (28),
￿












from which Lemma 1, part (i) follows. Q.E.D.
Part (ii) Recall from De￿nition 3 that ￿II(v;~ t) ￿ 0 is equivalent to ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r1 +
￿b;r1. It can be veri￿ed that (for (v;~ t) 2 P) ￿a;r1 + ￿b;r1 ￿ ￿a;r0 + ￿b;r0 (i.e. non-
participating independent ￿rms gain from a ￿rst stand-alone merger). Hence if ￿II ￿ 0,
it follows that ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r0 + ￿b;r0, which is equivalent to ￿IV ￿ 0.
Similarly, ￿III ￿ 0 is equivalent to ￿m;r3 ￿ ￿a;r2 + ￿b;r2. It can be veri￿ed that
￿a;r2 +￿b;r2 ￿ ￿a;r1 +￿b;r1 (i.e. non-participating independent ￿rms gain from a second
stand-alone merger). Hence if ￿III ￿ 0, it follows that ￿m;r3 ￿ ￿a;r1 + ￿b;r1, which is
equivalent to ￿V ￿ 0. From ￿a;r1 + ￿b;r1 ￿ ￿a;r0 + ￿b;r0, it follows from ￿V ￿ 0 that
￿m;r3 ￿ ￿a;r0 + ￿b;r0, which is equivalent to ￿V I ￿ 0. Q.E.D.
B.4 (Sketch of) Proof of Proposition 3
This proof follows largely from the proof of Lemma 1, noting the following de￿nitions:
￿ Zone (a):=
￿












(v;~ t) 2 P j ￿I(v;~ t) < 0, ￿II(v;~ t) < 0, ￿III(v;~ t) < 0
￿
That the zones and the boundaries between them are as stated (and depicted in
Figure 6) follows additionally from verifying that:






B are decreasing in ￿, the parameter of the straight
line segment, as this increases from 0 (line segment lies on top of the v-axis) to 1










A for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < 1 (line segment steep enough) and












B so that ￿II;A > ￿I;A and ￿II;B > ￿I;B for v00
B < v < v0
A
along any line segment ￿.
These elements su¢ ce to prove Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
37B.5 Proof of results depicted in Figure 8
I consider the equilibrium in each of zones (a), (c1) and (c2) of parameter space P in
turn, starting from a ￿xed cost G associated with implementing a cross-border merger
equal to zero (equilibria as in Figure 5, in the absence of ￿xed costs). I analyse how
these equilibria change as G increases from zero.
Notice that the ￿xed cost G of implementing a merger changes the conditions for
any merger to be pro￿table: whereas in the absence of the ￿xed cost this was given by
￿X(v;~ t) ￿ 0, for X 2 fI;II;III;IV;V;V Ig, where X represents the relevant merger
surplus function, the introduction of the ￿xed cost changes this condition to ￿X(v;~ t) ￿
G ￿ 0. (Refer to De￿nition 3. Recall that, for example, ￿V(v;~ t) re￿ ects the pro￿tability
of a merger which if carried through would induce a change in market structure from r1
(one cross-border merger) to r3 (three cross-border mergers).
Note from the Proof of Lemma 1, part (ii) above51 that for all (v;~ t) 2 P, ￿IV ￿ ￿II
and ￿V I ￿ ￿V ￿ ￿III.
I begin with (v;~ t) in zone (a). From the Proof of Lemma 1, part (i), in this zone
￿III ￿ ￿II ￿ ￿I ￿ 0. For G ￿ ￿I, the equilibrium (solved-out game tree) replicates
the equilibrium for zone (a) in the absence of ￿xed costs (Figure 5), where ￿rms choose
to merge from all nodes in the game tree. For ￿I < G ￿ ￿II, we have that ￿I ￿ G < 0
and thus ￿rms 3 and 6 will now choose not to merge conditional on 14 and 25. By
￿II ￿ G ￿ 0, ￿III ￿ ￿II and ￿IV ￿ ￿II, ￿rms continue choosing to merge from
all other nodes in the game tree. For this range of values of G, the equilibrium then
replicates the equilibrium for zone (c1) in the absence of ￿xed costs (Figure 5). For
￿II < G ￿ ￿III, ￿II ￿ G < 0 implies that ￿rms 3 and 6 will now choose not to merge
conditional on either 14 and 25, or 14 and 25. Since ￿I ￿ G < 0, ￿rms 3 and 6 will
still choose not to merge conditional on 14 and 25, and ￿rms 2 and 5 will now choose
not to merge conditional on 14. By ￿III ￿ G ￿ 0, ￿V ￿ ￿III and ￿V I ￿ ￿III, ￿rms
continue choosing to merge from all other nodes in the game tree. For this range of
values of G, the equilibrium then replicates the equilibrium for zone (c2) in the absence
of ￿xed costs (Figure 5). For G > ￿III, ￿rms 3 and 6 will now choose not to merge
conditional on 14 and 25. Since ￿II ￿G < 0, ￿rms 3 and 6 will still choose not to merge
conditional on either 14 and 25, or 14 and 25, and ￿rms 2 and 5 will now choose not to
merge conditional on 14. Since ￿I ￿G < 0, ￿rms 3 and 6 will still choose not to merge
conditional on 14 and 25, ￿rms 2 and 5 will still choose not to merge conditional on 14,
and ￿rms 1 and 4 will now choose not to merge. For this range of values of G, along the
equilibrium path no mergers occur and the equilibrium then replicates the equilibrium
for zone (h) in the absence of ￿xed costs (Figure 5).
The proofs of the equilibria for (v;~ t) in zones (c1) and (c2) follow from that of zone
(a). In zone (c1), by de￿nition, ￿I < 0 ￿ ￿II, and only the equilibria for zones (b),
(c2) and (h) in the absence of ￿xed costs can be replicated as G increases from zero, as
analysed for zone (a). In zone (c2), by de￿nition, ￿III ￿ 0 and ￿I;￿II < 0, and only
the equilibria for zones (c2) and (h) in the absence of ￿xed costs can be replicated as G
increases from zero, as analysed for zone (a). Q.E.D.
51For ease of exposition, I again suppress the arguments (v;~ t) of the merger surplus functions. I also
introduce the notation ij to depict the outcome where ￿rms i and j merge and ij as the complementary
(no-merger) outcome.
38C Appendix: Cross-border mergers in the Perry
and Porter (1985) model
C.1 Derivation of reduced-form pro￿t functions
Coming out of the (two) merger stages, there are three possible market structures: (i)
r0, where no cross-border is undertaken; (ii) r1, where one merger decision is favourable
but the other is not; and (iii) r2, where both mergers take place. I now turn to each.
(i) Under r0, independent A-country ￿rm 1 (say), owning capital stock k, sets outputs
in both countries A and B, respectively xA
1 and xB






















where its exports to country B are subject to the unit trade cost t. (Recall that P l(:)




i, and C(x;k) denotes the ￿rm￿ s cost function.) Given the functional forms































The FOCs for the other independent ￿rms, namely A-country ￿rm 2 and B-country
￿rms 3 and 4, can be similarly written, adjusting for the trade cost being incurred by
the latter two on their exports to country A. Solving the system of FOCs, and recalling
~ e = e
k (the rate of change of marginal cost) and ~ t = t
a￿d (the normalised trade cost), one
obtains XA = XB =
(a￿d)(4￿2~ t)




￿ ￿ = t
(￿rm i￿ s sales in its home market exceed its foreign-market sales by t, where i = 1;:::;4)




5+2~ e . (As before, despite
the slight abuse of notation, subscripts a, b and m denote an independent A-country
￿rm, an independent B-country ￿rm and a multinational ￿rm, respectively.) Clearly,
for trade between countries to be feasible, the parameter restriction ~ t ￿ 1
3+~ e must be
satis￿ed (this condition along with ~ e ￿ 0 and ~ t ￿ 0 de￿ne space P). Equilibrium prices
in both countries are pA = pB =
a(1+2~ e)+4d+2t
5+2~ e . The reduced-form pro￿t function follows
from evaluating each ￿rm￿ s objective function:
￿a;r0 = ￿b;r0 =
(a ￿ d)2
(5 + 2~ e)2
￿
2(1 + ~ e)(1 ￿ ~ t) +
~ t2
2
(2 + ~ e)(13 + 4~ e)
￿
￿ gk
(ii) Under r1, each of the two independent ￿rms a and b solves the same problem as
in (i). The multinational ￿rm m, formed from the merger of an independent A-country
￿rm and an independent B-country ￿rm, owns capital stock 2k and is twice as ￿large￿
as either of its independent rivals. Clearly, given the unit trade cost t ￿ 0 and the
cost function C(xA
m + xB
m;2k), it will no longer trade between countries, supplying each

















































Solving the systemof FOCs, one obtains sales in each country, XA = XB =
(a￿d)(3+4~ e)￿~ t(1+~ e)
4+7~ e+2~ e2 .




4+7~ e+2~ e2 . Indepen-




￿ ￿ = t,
i 2 fa;bg, where foreign-market sales xB
a = xA
b =
(a￿d)(1+~ e)(1￿~ t(3+~ e))
4+7~ e+2~ e2 . Equilibrium prices
are pA = pB =
a(1+~ e)(1+2~ e)+d(3+4~ e)+t(1+~ e)




(4 + 7~ e + 2~ e2)2
￿
(1 + 2~ e)
2(2 + ~ e) + 2~ t(1 + 2~ e)(2 + ~ e) + ~ t






(4 + 7~ e + 2~ e2)2
￿
2(1 + ~ e)
3 ￿ 2~ t(1 + ~ e)
2(2 + ~ e) + ~ t









(iii) Under r2, there are no shipments across countries, each multinational ￿rm solving
the same problem as in (ii) (FOCs given by (32) and (33)). Equilibrium sales in each
country are XA = XB =
2(a￿d)
3+~ e , while xA
m = xB
m = a￿d
3+~ e; prices are pA = pB =
a(1+~ e)+2d
3+~ e .
The reduced-form pro￿t function for each multinational ￿rm is
￿m;r2 =
(a ￿ d)2(2 + ~ e)
(3 + ~ e)2 ￿ 2gk
By Proposition 2, the four merger surplus functions necessary to solve the game can
then be computed:
￿I = ￿m;r1 ￿ ￿a;r0 ￿ ￿b;r0
=
(a ￿ d)2(1 ￿ 3~ t ￿ ~ t~ e)
￿
16~ t~ e5 + 148~ t~ e4 + 508~ t~ e3 + 4~ e3 + 4~ e2 + 789~ t~ e2 + 535~ t~ e ￿ 23~ e + 122~ t ￿ 14
￿
(5 + 2~ e)2(4 + 7~ e + 2~ e2)2
￿II = ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r1 ￿ ￿b;r1
=
(a ￿ d)2(1 ￿ 3~ t ￿ ~ t~ e)
￿
4~ t~ e5 + 41~ t~ e4 + 157~ t~ e3 + ~ e3 + 2~ e2 + 274~ t~ e2 + 212~ t~ e ￿ 4~ e + 60~ t ￿ 4
￿
(3 + ~ e)2(4 + 7~ e + 2~ e2)2
￿III = ￿m;r2 ￿ ￿a;r0 ￿ ￿b;r0
=
(a ￿ d)2(1 ￿ 3~ t ￿ ~ t~ e)
￿
4~ t~ e3 + 33~ t~ e2 + 89~ t~ e + 5~ e + 78~ t + 14
￿
(3 + ~ e)2(5 + 2~ e)2
￿IV = ￿m;r1 ￿ ￿a;r1 ￿ ￿b;r1
=
(a ￿ d)2(1 ￿ 3~ t ￿ ~ t~ e)
￿
4~ t~ e3 + 17~ t~ e2 + 19~ t~ e ￿ 3~ e + 6~ t ￿ 2
￿
(4 + 7~ e + 2~ e2)2
Note that the sign of each ￿-function corresponds to the sign of the polynomial in ~ t and
~ e in the last bracket in the numerator (since 1￿3~ t￿~ t~ e ￿ 0 in space P and 1￿3~ t￿~ t~ e = 0
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Set (c) Set (d)
Set (e) Set (f)
Set (g) Set (h)
Merger No merger
Merger No merger Merger No merger
Merger No merger Merger No merger
Merger No merger Merger No merger
Firms in
Firms in Firms in
Figure 2: Possible equilibrium sets of Nash strategies. From each node, left depicts
￿merger￿and right depicts ￿no merger￿
42Set (c) Set (d)
Set (e) Set (f)
Set (h)
Merger No merger Merger No merger





Firms in Firms in
Figure 3: Possible equilibrium sets of strategies in the case of symmetry: all six
are possible, three of which survive after the imposition of the Su¢ cient Condition of
Corollary 1 (and are highlighted inside boxes)
43Firms 1 and 4 (decide whether to merge)
Firms 2 and 5
Firms 3 and 6
Merger: M1
Merger: M2 M2
Merger: M3 M3 M3 M3
No merger: 1,4
No merger: 2,5 2,5
3,6 3,6 3,6 No merger: 3,6
Firms 2 and 5
Firms 3 and 6
r3 r2 r2 r1 r2 r1 r1 r0







Country A Country B











r3 r2 r1 r0
Merger surplus functions
Figure 4: (Example 1) Sequential cross-border merger game and merger surplus
functions. (The notation is adapted to re￿ ect three merger stages and considers the
symmetry of the model.)
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Figure 5: (Example 1) Equilibrium of sequential merger game in each zone; v quality






















Figure 6: (Example 1) Zones in P space
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Figure 7: (Example 2) Equilibrium of sequential merger game in each zone and zones

























Firms 1 and 4
Firms 2 and 5
Firms 3 and 6
M1
M2 M2
M3 M3 M3 M3
1,4
2,5 2,5
3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6
Firms 1 and 4
Firms 2 and 5
Firms 3 and 6
M1
M2 M2
M3 M3 M3 M3
1,4
2,5 2,5
3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6
Firms 1 and 4
Firms 2 and 5
Firms 3 and 6
M1
M2 M2
M3 M3 M3 M3
1,4
2,5 2,5
3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6
Firms 1 and 4
Firms 2 and 5
Firms 3 and 6
M1
M2 M2
M3 M3 M3 M3
1,4
2,5 2,5
3,6 3,6 3,6 3,6
(v,t) in zone (a), G>ȌIII
(v,t) in zone (c1), G>ȌIII
(v,t) in zone (c2), G>ȌIII
(v,t) in zone (h), G>= 0
Replicates the equilibrium in
zone (h) in the absence of
fixed costs (Figure 5)
(v,t) in zone (a), ȌII<G<= ȌIII
(v,t) in zone (c1), ȌII<G<=ȌIII
(v,t) in zone (c2), 0 <= G<= ȌIII
Replicates the equilibrium in
zone (c2) in the absence of








(v,t) in zone (a), ȌI<G<= ȌII
(v,t) in zone (c1), 0 <= G<= ȌII
Replicates the equilibrium in
zone (c1) in the absence of
fixed costs (Figure 5)
(v,t) in zone (a), 0 <= G<= ȌI
Replicates the equilibrium in
zone (a) in the absence of





Figure 8: (Example 1) Investment integration and sequential cross-border mergers
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